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This dissertation inquires into the relationship between income, aspirations,
and life satisfaction in post-transition Russia. It first explores the channels through
which adaptation and social comparison contribute to higher income aspirations.
The results show that social comparison is a strong agent in shaping aspirations,
while the effect of adaptation is relatively weak. Subsequently, the dissertation tests
for the effect of aspirations on two separate satisfaction indices, satisfaction with
life and satisfaction with economic conditions. This dissertation uses a Chamberlain
random-effects ordered probit estimation to control for time-invariant unobservable
individual traits. In contrast to previous studies, the results suggest that increases
in aspirations have a positive effect on life satisfaction. This dissertation argues
that this is caused by the expectations contained in income aspirations. Higher
aspirations reflect an increase in needs commensurate to changes in own and others’
income, but they also reflect improved income expectations based on the information
provided by the present income of relevant others. The improved outlook embedded
in the higher income aspirations causes the latter to have a positive effect on life
satisfaction. This suggests that, ten years into the transition process, the reaction
patterns of life satisfaction in Russia differ substantially from those in developed
countries.
While the relationship between life satisfaction and income or institutions has
recently received a lot attention, the relationship between life satisfaction and accu-
mulated wealth remains unexplored. This dissertation makes use of the 2008 Gallup
World Poll and a novel wealth database compiled by the World Bank to evaluate the
effect of wealth, produced capital, and natural resources on life satisfaction. The
dissertation finds that both produced capital and natural capital have a positive
effect on life satisfaction. The effect of good institutions and informal safety nets
is also positive. However, in results that parallel findings from the resource curse
literature, this dissertation shows that the positive effect of natural capital is due
to diffuse natural resources like cropland, pastureland and forestry. Subsoil asset
wealth has no significant effect on life satisfaction.
Blood feuds represent a significant challenge to law enforcement, institutional
consolidation and economic development due to the violence they generate and the
other forms of crime they contribute to. This paper seeks to model and explain
the decision making dynamics behind blood feuds. Rather than a simple retaliatory
act, the violence associated with blood feuds is very much an integral aspect of an
institutional framework that reflects a different set of ecological conditions and pref-
erences. This paper incorporates different cultural and ecological aspects of various
societies into a theoretical model that explains how blood feuds are sustained in a
society. In addition, the model developed in this paper helps explain the longevity
of blood feuds and reconcile different views from the anthropology literature.
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It has been widely assumed that as income increases, social comparison and adap-
tation contribute to higher income aspirations, which in turn mitigate the effect of
income increases on life satisfaction. This process is believed to have been the cause
behind the flat relationship in time between income and happiness in industrialized
countries after World War II. On the other hand, studies on transition countries
show that life satisfaction has increased in time parallel to real income, especially
during the early years of transition, indicating that in these countries the response
patterns of life satisfaction are significantly different from those in industrialized
countries. This dissertation first explores the channels through which adaptation
and social comparison contribute to higher income aspirations. The results show
that social comparison is a strong agent in shaping aspirations, while the effect of
adaptation is relatively weak. Subsequently, the dissertation tests for the effect of
aspirations on two separate satisfaction indices, satisfaction with life and satisfaction
with economic conditions. The dissertation uses a Chamberlain random-effects or-
1
dered probit estimation to control for time-invariant unobservable individual traits.
In contrast to previous studies, the results suggest that increases in aspirations have
a positive effect on life satisfaction. This dissertation argues that this is caused
by the expectations contained in income aspirations. Higher aspirations reflect an
increase in needs commensurate to changes in own and others’ income, but they
also reflect improved income expectations based on the information provided by the
present income of relevant others. The improved outlook embedded in the higher
income aspirations causes the latter to have a positive effect on life satisfaction.
This suggests that, ten years into the transition process, the reaction patterns of life
satisfaction in Russia differ substantially from those in developed countries.
1.1 Aspirations and Life Satisfaction in Transi-
tion:
How Wanting More Increases Happiness
Recent years have witnessed a blooming of the literature on life satisfaction with
a focus on the relationship between income and happiness.1 A number of studies
on industrialized countries suggest that, though individuals with higher income are
generally happier than those with less, an increase in income does not have a perma-
nent effect on satisfaction with life. This phenomenon, which became known as the
Easterlin paradox, was illustrated by the fact that in the four decades after World
1A number of papers, notably Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998), have focused on the rela-
tionship between employment and happiness beyond the pecuniary effect of employment.
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War II average life satisfaction remained constant even though per capita income
in the industrialized countries almost doubled Clark et al. (2008). Easterlin’s re-
sults have been challenged by several recent papers that make use of newly available
data to show the existence of a positive effect of income on life satisfaction. Deaton
(2008) finds a strong cross-country relationship between per capita GDP and life
satisfaction. Sacks et al. (2010) confirm that, and also find that life satisfaction in-
creases with economic growth. Guriev and Zhuravskaya (2009), in a study that uses
data from the World Values Survey, also find that higher income is associated with
higher happiness levels. This paper contributes to the life satisfaction literature by
conducting an aspirations-based analysis of the determinants of life satisfaction in
transition Russia.
Easterlin (1974, 2003b) argued that what he saw as a lack of a significant
correlation between income and happiness was explained by the negative effect of
increases in aspirations on life satisfaction. Increases in individual income as well
as income of other individuals lead to an increase in aspirations, which reduces
satisfaction with life. The two main processes that affect individuals’ aspirations
have been identified in the literature as social comparison and adaptation.2 Thus,
individuals adjust their aspirations to the income and consumption level of relevant
others3 (social comparison) and to their own past income levels (adaptation). Clark
et al. (2008) internalize both social comparison and adaptation in a utility function
2Clark et al. (2008) would describe social comparison and adaptation as the two processes
that contribute into an individual’s relative evaluation of income, whereas Stutzer (2004) identifies
them as the two processes that contribute to the formation of an individual’s aspirations.
3Relevant others can be defined as individuals with similar job market characteristics (Senik
2004) or as individuals one is likely to be in constant interaction with (Stutzer 2004).
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that provides the theoretical framework necessary to reconcile the effect of income on
happiness at any given time with the essentially flat happiness curve in industrialized
countries. While these studies assume that an increase in relevant others’ income
has a negative effect on life satisfaction, Hirschman and Rothschild (1973) pointed
out the possibility of a positive effect, particularly in a developing country context.
They argue that if income and opportunities are increasing in a developing country,
a higher income of relevant others might act a positive signal as regards one’s own
future income, and thus increase life satisfaction. They label this the “tunnel effect”4
and argue that, once a country reaches a certain threshold of economic development,
the effect should vanish and social comparison should regain its negative effect on
life satisfaction. Senik (2004) finds a positive effect of relevant others’ income on
satisfaction in Russia during the early years of transition.
In Easterlin’s analysis, however, aspirations are regarded as the key agent that
shapes individuals’ reaction to events and the influence these events have on satis-
faction with life. Social comparison and adaptation affect life satisfaction through
the increase they cause on material aspirations. As such, a good grasp of the process
through which material aspirations are formed and evolve is a crucial component of
the study of life satisfaction and its determinants. This paper offers an aspirations-
based analysis of life satisfaction in Russia in the later stage of transition.5
The relationship between income and life satisfaction in transition has been
4The name is based on a traffic metaphor. While in congested traffic in a tunnel, the movement
of cars in other lanes indicates that traffic is flowing and is taken as a positive signal as regards
movement in one’s own lane.
5The analysis of this paper is based on three consecutive waves of the Russian Panel, 2000,
2001 and 2002.
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explored by Lokshin and Ravallion (2000) and Frijters et al. (2006), whereas Senik
(2004) focuses on the relationship between life satisfaction and income distribution.
All of these studies use individual or household data from the Russia Longitudinal
Monitoring Survey (RLMS), which is also the data used in this study. However,
these studies do not estimate the aspiration-building process, nor do they inquire
into the role of aspirations (as revealed by individuals themselves) in individuals’
life satisfaction adjustment.
This paper uses one of the questions of the RLMS posed in four rounds from
1998 to 2002 to capture individuals’ aspirations and proceeds to explore the condi-
tions through which income aspirations are formed. To that end, this paper tests
for the impact of two processes on aspirations: (1) the impact of individual income
changes from previous periods (adaptation), and (2) the impact of changes in the
income level of the social group one would likely compare oneself to (social compar-
ison). The results suggest that social comparison is a considerably stronger agent
in shaping aspirations than adaptation is. Aspirations respond strongly to changes
in reference group income, whereas the effect of individual income changes is quite
weak.
After establishing the role of these two processes in the formation of aspira-
tions, this paper explores the trends and determinants of satisfaction and tests for
the presence of hedonic adaptation and social comparison. The focus is on two
different measures: satisfaction with life and satisfaction with economic conditions.
In contrast to previous work on RLMS, this paper not only controls for the effect
of income, employment and asset ownership, but also places a special focus on as-
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pirations as the main agent through which adaptation and social comparison exert
their influence on satisfaction.
The results show that aspirations have a significant impact on life satisfac-
tion but not on satisfaction with economic conditions. However, contrary to what
Easterlin (1974, 2003b) predicts about the effect of aspirations on life satisfaction
and what empirical studies to date (Easterlin, 2001b; Stutzer, 2004) have found,
this paper finds that aspirations increases have a positive effect on life satisfaction.
This is due to the double functionality of aspirations. They reflect an increase in
needs commensurate to changes in own and others’ income, but they also reflect
improved income expectations based on the information provided by the present
income of relevant others. These results point to the existence of a “tunnel effect”
similar to the one predicted by Hirschman and Rothschield (1973) for developing
countries. The improved expectations embedded in the higher income aspirations
cause increases in the latter to have a positive effect on life satisfaction.
1.2 Wealth and Happiness of Nations:
The Resource Curse from a New Angle
While the relationship between life satisfaction and income or institutions has re-
cently received a lot attention, the relationship between life satisfaction and accu-
mulated wealth remains unexplored. This dissertation makes use of the 2008 Gallup
World Poll and a novel wealth database compiled by the World Bank to evaluate the
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effect of wealth, produced capital, and natural resources on life satisfaction. This
dissertation finds that both produced capital and natural capital have a positive
effect on life satisfaction. The effect of good institutions and informal safety nets
is also positive. However, in results that parallel findings from the resource curse
literature, this dissertation shows that the positive effect of natural capital is due
to diffuse natural resources like cropland, pastureland and forestry. Subsoil asset
wealth has no significant effect on life satisfaction.
The determinants of happiness have been an increasingly popular research
topic during the past decade. Several studies have focused on the effects on hap-
piness of income, institutional quality and freedom. A consensus has emerged that
seems to suggest that, while in industrialized countries increasing income does not
contribute to rising life satisfaction, there appears to exist a positive relationship
between the two in developing countries. Clark et al. (2008) report that happiness
in industrialized countries has essentially remained stable for the last three decades,
while real income has almost doubled. Oswald (1997) finds that in both Western
Europe and the United States the average level of satisfaction with life has risen very
slightly. On the other side, Frijters et al. (2004) find that in Eastern Germany life
satisfaction has increased significantly in from 1991 to 2002 and the rising income
has had a significant and positive effect on happiness.
Cross-country studies such as Inglehart et al. (2008) find a significant cor-
relation between development and happiness. In another cross-country study, Di
Tella et al. (2003) find that, after controlling for country fixed effects, happiness is
strongly correlated with present and lagged GDP per capita. Deaton (2008) also
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finds a strong cross-country relationship between per capita GDP and life satis-
faction. Better institutions also seem to have a positive effect on life satisfaction.
Inglehart et al. (2008) and Frey and Stutzer (2000) find that institutional variables,
such as free choice and possibilities of individual participation have a significant and
positive effect on happiness. Furthermore, Alesina et al. (2004) and Graham and
Felton (2006) find that inequality has a negative effect on happiness.
The studies listed above are the most prominent of a burgeoning literature
that is increasingly enabling a better understanding of the interaction between in-
come, institutions and life satisfaction. However, what remains unexplored is the
relationship between accumulated capital, natural resources and life satisfaction.
Accumulated wealth, natural or produced, reflects a country’s long term productiv-
ity and institutional quality and captures the effect of national wealth in a way that
income cannot. Furthermore, the ability to distinguish between produced and nat-
ural capital, as well as between different sources of natural capital, enables a review
of the effect of the resource curse on national well-being from a different perspective.
The research on the relationship between natural resources and economic and
institutional performance has been gravitating towards the conclusion that natural
resource abundance is likely to have a negative effect on economic growth (Sachs
and Warner, 1995), contributing to the so-called resource curse theory. Roos (2001)
and Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) also find that oil and mineral resources
have a negative impact on institutional development. Murshed (2003) and Isham
et al. (2005) draw the distinction between economies with point-based resources
and those with diffuse resources, finding that the resource curse is more likely to
8
describe the state of affairs in the former.
This dissertation seeks to bridge the gap between the life satisfaction literature
and the natural resource literature. It does so by combining data from a newly
available wealth database from the World Bank (World Bank, 2006) and the 2008
Gallup World Poll (Gallup, Inc., 2009),6 and gauging the effect of produced and
natural wealth on life satisfaction.
We find that both produced and natural wealth have a positive and significant
on life satisfaction. However, after disaggregating natural wealth into extracted and
non-extracted wealth, we find that only non-extracted wealth has a positive effect,
whereas the effect of extractive wealth is insignificant. Puzzling as these results
might appear, they do not contradict the prevailing wisdom in the area.
A country affected by the resource curse will typically be characterized by a
combination of overinvestment in the resource-rich sector and underinvestment in
other sectors, high exposure to commodity price fluctuations and concentration of
economic and political influence in the hands of small elites. And the resource curse
typified by these features is likely to negatively affect life satisfaction in a coun-
try through the limitations in investment, employment and political participation
opportunities.
However, not all resource riches need to lead to a resource curse. As argued
by Acemoglu et al. (2001) and demonstrated by Isham et al. (2005), conditions
that facilitate a more equitable distribution of investment and income (such as land
abundance or soil quality) need not be conducive to economic and political insti-
6Summary Statistics are presented in Tables B.1 and B.2 in the Appendix.
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tutions similar to those experienced by resource curse countries. It is the existence
of natural wealth that is highly valued in international markets (such as oil or gas)
and can only be taken advantage through extractive industries where ownership is
more likely to be concentrated in a few hands that will be more likely to lead to
resource curse conditions.
1.3 Blood Feuds: The Economics of a Dismal In-
stitution
Blood feuds represent a significant challenge to law enforcement, institutional consol-
idation and economic development due to the violence they generate and the other
forms of crime they contribute to. This dissertation seeks to model and explain
the decision making dynamics behind blood feuds. Rather than a simple retalia-
tory act, the violence associated with blood feuds is very much an integral aspect
of an institutional framework that reflects a different set of ecological conditions
and preferences. This dissertation incorporates different cultural and ecological as-
pects of various societies into a theoretical model that explains how blood feuds
are sustained in a society. In addition, the model developed in this dissertation
helps explain the longevity of blood feuds and reconcile different views from the
anthropology literature.
The institutional composition of a society, that is the network of legal, political
and economic institutions together with the set of beliefs and expectations these
10
institutions generate and are, in turn, supported by, has been shown to have a
substantial effect on growth and economic performance. North (1990) assesses the
importance of well-designed institutions on economic performance and Acemoglu et
al. (2001) supply a thorough analysis of the effects of different institutional setups
on the long-term economic performance of various regions in Africa, Oceania, and
the Americas that were ruled or colonized by Europeans.
Of all institutional features, a well functioning legal system and a political
entity with a strong law enforcement capacity are indispensable prerequisites for the
existence of a well-functioning market economy; without them even the most basic
rights to security of life and property are severely under threat, rendering the proper
functioning of a market economy impossible. For a legal system to be successful,
its acceptance by every person in a given country or region is a basic condition;
it is threatened by remnant components of conflicting legal systems, which reflect
different preferences and could encourage types of behavior that run counter to the
official legal system.
This dissertation focuses on the effects of an informal enforcement structure
on welfare, stability and the behavior it encourages in countries or regions where
it has not been fully and successfully replaced by a modern, government-enforced
legal system. That enforcement structure is the blood feud. In the societies this
dissertation focuses on, it appears to be the case that, though customary law has lost
its normative power, particular types of behavior and institutions associated with
it in the past continue to exist. For instance, in Northern Albania, one of the main
study areas, although the historical customary code of conduct pertaining to many
11
aspects of life in a society has widely disappeared and ceased to regulate people’s
lives, the blood feud continues to exist with detrimental effects to the security of
life and property.
A blood feud consists of a chain of reciprocal killings between members of two
opposing clans and often lasts for generations. Far from being regarded as isolated
spurs of violence, anthropological research has viewed the blood feuds as an insti-
tution that has regulated violence and provided a “cohesive force” (Black-Michaud
1972) for the societies in which they have been present throughout centuries. As
such, blood feuds display a number of strictly regulated features and are generally
supported by a wider set of societal norms. In Northern Albania, they have been
supported and regulated by the Kanun of Leke Dukagjini, a wide body of customary
law in existence since the middle of the 15th century. Among various Bedouin tribes
in Israel, blood feuds are regulated by a set of norms that is predominantly orally
transmitted rather than codified in writing.
Blood feuds have also been and continue to be present in Afghanistan and
Northern Pakistan (Rubin, 2002; Schoffield 2003). It is even argued that blood
feuds fueled the civil war in Afghanistan, although Nojumi (2002) rejects that ar-
gument. While there is not necessarily an established link between blood feuds and
illegal activity in all countries7 in which blood feuds have persisted, there is a con-
nection between blood feuds and organized crime in Albania and Brazil (De Souza
Mello Bicalho and Hoeffle, 2005). Some of the institutional features that support
blood feuds, such as disregard for the formal legal structure, clan discipline and
7Afghanistan, Albania, Brazil, Israel, Mexico, Pakistan.
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a propensity for violence could easily become valuable assets for organized crime.
Eradicating blood feuds and replacing their supporting institutions would go beyond
establishing law and order, and have deeper implications for future crime prevention,
institutional consolidation and social cohesion and for the development of a region
in general. In order to eradicate the blood feud as an institution, it is necessary to
better understand the decision-making process of feuding clans, the dynamics of the
feud’s replication in time, and the conditions under which they can be dismantled.
The major questions this dissertation sets out to answer include: (1) What is
the blood feud’s typical longevity? (2) How do blood feuds persist through time and
resist competition from other institutions (including government-sponsored modern
legal systems), or how are they not only “self-enforcing” but also “self-re-enforcing”
(Greif, 1994)?
There is no consensus in the literature (Middleton and Tait, 1958; Peters,
1967; Black-Michaud, 1975) on the answer to the first question - whether the blood
feud is finite or infinite. This dissertation introduces a model that combines both
views and demonstrates how both types of conflict can coexist in a society.
This dissertation focuses on collective responsibility as the main cause behind
the persistence of blood feuds and argues that only societies that have successfully
completed a transition from collective to individual responsibility have been able
to eradicate blood feuds. The capacity of a society to alter its institutions in the
long run is explored by treating the institution of “collective responsibility” as en-
dogenous in an environment of changing economic opportunities. This dissertation
concludes that while payoffs are determined in the short run by the existing insti-
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tutional structure, in the long run changes in payoffs contribute to a change in the
institutional structure.
1.4 Outline
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 explores how income aspirations
are formed, and how they affect life satiscfaction. Chapter 3 inquires into the effect
of accumulated wealth on life satisfaction across countries. Chapter 4 models the




Aspirations and Life Satisfaction
in Transition:
How Wanting More Increases
Happiness
2.1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed a blooming of the literature on life satisfaction with
a focus on the relationship between income and happiness.1 A number of studies
on industrialized countries suggest that, though individuals with higher income are
generally happier than those with less, an increase in income does not have a perma-
nent effect on satisfaction with life. This phenomenon, which became known as the
1A number of papers, notably Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998), have focused on the rela-
tionship between employment and happiness beyond the pecuniary effect of employment.
15
Easterlin paradox, was illustrated by the fact that in the four decades after World
War II average life satisfaction remained constant even though per capita income
in the industrialized countries almost doubled Clark et al. (2008). Easterlin’s re-
sults have been challenged by several recent papers that make use of newly available
data to show the existence of a positive effect of income on life satisfaction. Deaton
(2008) finds a strong cross-country relationship between per capita GDP and life
satisfaction. Sacks et al. (2010) confirm that, and also find that life satisfaction in-
creases with economic growth. Guriev and Zhuravskaya (2009), in a study that uses
data from the World Values Survey, also find that higher income is associated with
higher happiness levels. This paper contributes to the life satisfaction literature by
conducting an aspirations-based analysis of the determinants of life satisfaction in
transition Russia.
Easterlin (1974, 2003b) argued that what he saw as a lack of a significant
correlation between income and happiness was explained by the negative effect of
increases in aspirations on life satisfaction. Increases in individual income as well
as income of other individuals lead to an increase in aspirations, which reduces
satisfaction with life. The two main processes that affect individuals’ aspirations
have been identified in the literature as social comparison and adaptation.2 Thus,
individuals adjust their aspirations to the income and consumption level of relevant
others3 (social comparison) and to their own past income levels (adaptation). Clark
2Clark et al. (2008) would describe social comparison and adaptation as the two processes
that contribute into an individual’s relative evaluation of income, whereas Stutzer (2004) identifies
them as the two processes that contribute to the formation of an individual’s aspirations.
3Relevant others can be defined as individuals with similar job market characteristics (Senik
2004) or as individuals one is likely to be in constant interaction with (Stutzer 2004).
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et al. (2008) internalize both social comparison and adaptation in a utility function
that provides the theoretical framework necessary to reconcile the effect of income on
happiness at any given time with the essentially flat happiness curve in industrialized
countries. While these studies assume that an increase in relevant others’ income
has a negative effect on life satisfaction, Hirschman and Rothschild (1973) pointed
out the possibility of a positive effect, particularly in a developing country context.
They argue that if income and opportunities are increasing in a developing country,
a higher income of relevant others might act a positive signal as regards one’s own
future income, and thus increase life satisfaction. They label this the “tunnel effect”4
and argue that, once a country reaches a certain threshold of economic development,
the effect should vanish and social comparison should regain its negative effect on
life satisfaction. Senik (2004) finds a positive effect of relevant others’ income on
satisfaction in Russia during the early years of transition.
In Easterlin’s analysis, however, aspirations are regarded as the key agent that
shapes individuals’ reaction to events and the influence these events have on satis-
faction with life. Social comparison and adaptation affect life satisfaction through
the increase they cause on material aspirations. As such, a good grasp of the process
through which material aspirations are formed and evolve is a crucial component of
the study of life satisfaction and its determinants. This paper offers an aspirations-
based analysis of life satisfaction in Russia in the later stage of transition.5
4The name is based on a traffic metaphor. While in congested traffic in a tunnel, the movement
of cars in other lanes indicates that traffic is flowing and is taken as a positive signal as regards
movement in one’s own lane.
5The analysis of this paper is based on three consecutive waves of the Russian Panel, 2000,
2001 and 2002.
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The relationship between income and life satisfaction in transition has been
explored by Lokshin and Ravallion (2000) and Frijters et al. (2006), whereas Senik
(2004) focuses on the relationship between life satisfaction and income distribution.
All of these studies use individual or household data from the Russia Longitudinal
Monitoring Survey (RLMS), which is also the data used in this study. However,
these studies do not estimate the aspiration-building process, nor do they inquire
into the role of aspirations (as revealed by individuals themselves) in individuals’
life satisfaction adjustment.
This paper uses one of the questions of the RLMS posed in four rounds from
1998 to 2002 to capture individuals’ aspirations and proceeds to explore the condi-
tions through which income aspirations are formed. To that end, this paper tests
for the impact of two processes on aspirations: (1) the impact of individual income
changes from previous periods (adaptation), and (2) the impact of changes in the
income level of the social group one would likely compare oneself to (social compar-
ison). The results suggest that social comparison is a considerably stronger agent
in shaping aspirations than adaptation is. Aspirations respond strongly to changes
in reference group income, whereas the effect of individual income changes is quite
weak.
After establishing the role of these two processes in the formation of aspira-
tions, this paper explores the trends and determinants of satisfaction and tests for
the presence of hedonic adaptation and social comparison. The focus is on two
different measures: satisfaction with life and satisfaction with economic conditions.
In contrast to previous work on RLMS, this paper not only controls for the effect
18
of income, employment and asset ownership, but also places a special focus on as-
pirations as the main agent through which adaptation and social comparison exert
their influence on satisfaction.
The results show that aspirations have a significant impact on life satisfac-
tion but not on satisfaction with economic conditions. However, contrary to what
Easterlin (1974, 2003b) predicts about the effect of aspirations on life satisfaction
and what empirical studies to date (Easterlin, 2001b; Stutzer, 2004) have found,
this paper finds that aspirations increases have a positive effect on life satisfaction.
This is due to the double functionality of aspirations. They reflect an increase in
needs commensurate to changes in own and others’ income, but they also reflect
improved income expectations based on the information provided by the present
income of relevant others. These results point to the existence of a “tunnel effect”
similar to the one predicted by Hirschman and Rothschield (1973) for developing
countries. The improved expectations embedded in the higher income aspirations
cause increases in the latter to have a positive effect on life satisfaction.
After providing some institutional background for the data and results (Section
2.2), the paper proceeds with a brief data overview and description of key variables
for the analysis (Section 2.3). Section 2.4 explores the process through which in-
dividuals’ income aspirations are generated, and Section 2.5 tests for the presence
of hedonic adaptation in the relationship between the two satisfaction indices and
income. Section 2.6 concludes this paper.
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2.2 Institutional Background
Individual attitudes in the face of changing conditions are formed within a certain
economic and social reality. Abrupt changes of this reality will have a role of their
own in shaping individuals’ reaction to individual shocks. For example, in a free-
market economy where unemployment is recognized as a fact of life, an individual’s
reaction to becoming unemployed is bound to be different from the reaction to the
same event in a society where unemployment is a relatively unknown phenomenon.
The multi-faceted transition process in Russia was accompanied by the emer-
gence of a host of phenomena that, while widely recognized and accepted as features
of the economic reality in countries with a relatively free market and a significantly
large private sector, were almost entirely unknown prior to transition. Income and
employment volatility and income disparity were some of these new phenomena in
transition countries. Before the start of the economic and political transition indi-
viduals used to enjoy virtually unquestioned income and job security and, although
regional and, to a lesser extent, individual income disparities did exist, it is only af-
ter the start of the transition that they experienced income and job fluctuation and
witnessed significant income inequalities. Milanovic (1998) points to “. . . declining
incomes and rising inequality” and reports that, during the 1988-1994 period, un-
employment increased from 0 to 7 percent in Russia and 15 percent in Poland. In
Russia (ibid.) real wages were cut in half and the Gini coefficient doubled from 24 to
48 during the same period. Hence, due to the associated introduction of these and
many other new economic and social phenomena, the transition process in Eastern
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Europe can be best depicted as a meta-event that altered the way in which people
think, behave and react in an unprecedented way. Roland (1999) describes the tran-
sition in Eastern Europe (and Central Asia) as “. . . one of the most important events
of the twentieth century, along with the transition from capitalism to socialism and
the Great Depression.”
Individuals in transition countries had to adapt rapidly to phenomena most
of them were exposed to for the first time in their lifetimes. Their attitudes and
reactions to these phenomena were strongly influenced by the unfolding transition
process. The study of the relationship between life satisfaction and income changes
takes on a different significance in an environment where income fluctuations and
the behavioral reaction to them are a novelty. This renders transition countries a
fertile experimental ground for the life satisfaction literature.
The life satisfaction literature, in turn, can contribute to transition studies in
terms of evaluating the impact of economic and political reforms. Layard (2006) con-
cludes that the inclusion of self-reported measures of well-being in the realm of public
economics is bound to revolutionize the discipline, leading to a better informed anal-
ysis and improved policy-making. The assumption behind this conclusion is that
the concept of happiness is too complex to be captured by the simplified model of
cardinal utility.6 Subsequently, self-reported measures of well-being enable us to
approximate an individual’s utility in a way that has been unavailable until now,
equipping policy makers with a set of parameters to use in their decision-making.
6Layard simplifies the cardinal utility function as u = u(y, h), u1 > 0 and u2 < 0, where y
denotes real income and h denotes work hours.
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The degree of political, economic and societal change that affected individuals’
life quality in transition countries was unprecedented. The changes were overwhelm-
ing and affected every facet of life. The centralized economy was replaced by a free
market, and freedom of expression and democratic elections were in some countries
re-introduced after at least four decades or were entirely novel occurrences in oth-
ers.7 The impact of these changes on individuals’ lives stretches well beyond the
explanatory power of commonplace indicators such as growth, inflation and unem-
ployment. As such, transition countries provide the milieu where the argument of
Layard holds par excellence. It can be argued that self-reported life satisfaction
in these countries is the best indicator of the impact of the reforms undertaken in
these countries on individual welfare, as it reflects changes in attitudes and reactions
related to a mix of events and phenomena never experienced before. Thus, a better
understanding of the determinants of life satisfaction in transition countries enables
this paper to better evaluate the impact of reforms on the life quality of individuals
beyond the commonly used economic and institutional criteria.
The Russian panel has been used by several studies to gauge the welfare impact
of transition and explore the determinants of life satisfaction.8 However, there is
7A number of countries that formed after the dissolution of the Soviet Union had never been
democratic societies before (Polity IV Dataset 2007).
8Lokshin and Ravallion (2002), Ravallion and Lokshin (2001), Senik (2004) and Frijters et al.
(2006) are similar to this paper in terms of methodology and objectives. Ravallion and Lokshin
(2001) use the 1994 and 1996 waves of the panel and focus on economic self-ranking rather than
life satisfaction or satisfaction with economic conditions as a proxy for individual welfare. Their
earlier paper in 2000 uses the 1996 and 1998 waves to evaluate the welfare impacts of the 1998 crisis
and the response of the public safety net. Senik (2004) uses the RLMS rounds from 1994 to 2000
and focuses on the effect of inequality on individuals’ life satisfaction. Frijters et al. (2006) use the
survey rounds from 1995-2001 in a fixed-effects ordinal estimation and also employ a decomposition
analysis that accounts for panel attrition in attempting to asses the role of increases in real income
on life satisfaction.
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no study based on the Russian panel that focuses on the processes of adaption and
social comparison through which aspirations are shaped.9 Most importantly, none
of the studies described above has, as of yet, made use of the Russian panel to
inquire into the effect of changing aspirations and consumption standards on life
satisfaction and test for the existence of hedonic adaptation in a transition context.
This study aims at filling this research gap by estimating the aspiration-formation
process and providing an aspiration-based analysis on the patterns of life satisfaction
and hedonic adaptation in transition Russia.
2.3 Data and Overview
This paper uses individual data from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey
(RLMS, 2006), a series of nationally representative surveys designed to monitor the
effects of Russian reforms on the health and economic welfare of households and
individuals in the Russian Federation.10 The RLMS has been administered 13 times
from 1992 to 2006, skipping the years 1997 and 1999. It was designed mainly as a
repeated cross-sectional survey of dwelling units rather than as a panel. However,
it does keep track of individuals that were respondents in previous rounds.
This paper constructed a panel that includes the survey rounds conducted
9Senik (2004) finds that reference group income has a positive effect on life satisfaction, which
suggests that individuals use it as a predictor of their income in the future (tunnel effect) rather
than for present comparison purposes. Her work, however, does not focus on the relationship
between social comparison and aspirations, but rather attempts to assess the direct effect of social
comparison on life satisfaction.
10The author thanks the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development for making the
RLMS database available to him while he was working there. Most of the research for this paper
was completed during this time.
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from 1995 to 2006, in which all individuals are included that were present for at
least two consecutive rounds (about 9000 respondents per round). The question
used to gauge income aspirations was asked only in the four rounds from 1998
to 2002. The question regarding satisfaction with economic conditions was asked
from 2000 to 2002. It is formulated as: “In your opinion how much money would
be needed per month for your family to live normally?”.11 The question used to
measure satisfaction with life is: “How satisfied are you with your life?”, where 1 is
coded as “not at all satisfied,” 2 as “less them satisfied,” 3 as “neither satisfied, nor
dissatisfied,” 4 as “rather satisfied,” and 5 as “fully satisfied.” Lastly, satisfaction
with economic conditions is measured by the question: “How satisfied are you with
your economic conditions?”, which is asked after the life satisfaction question.12
The answers are coded in the same way. Table 2.1 displays the number of responses
for the questions asked to obtain individuals’ monthly income, economic aspirations,
satisfaction with life and satisfaction with the economic conditions during the rounds
in which all questions listed above were asked.
Table 2.1: Number of Observations for Selected Variables, By Year
Year 2000 2001 2002
Satisfaction with Life 8831 9433 9650
Satisfaction with Economic Conditions 7977 8610 9010
Monthly income 8692 9244 9437
Aspirations 8266 8859 9246
As depicted in Figure 2.1, income, aspirations and both measures of satisfac-
11A broader discussion on the options for a variable that captures aspirations and on our choice
for it will be provided in Section 2.4.
12The “Satisfaction with Economic Conditions” question is asked right after the “Satisfaction
with Life” question. The “Aspirations” question is placed in the next page after the two “Satis-
faction” questions and about three pages after the “monthly income” question.
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tion increase steadily during the respective periods. While income and aspirations
increase parallel to each other, the slope of the life satisfaction curve clearly flattens
with time. In fact, the average level of life satisfaction drops slightly in 2003, after
which it recovers and settles around a fixed level, although income keeps increasing
during the same period. Frijters et al. (2004) find a similar trend of life satisfaction
in East Germany and also demonstrate that after an initial increasing trajectory
following re-unification with West Germany, life satisfaction settled around a con-
stant value. Figure 2.1 shows that the slope of life satisfaction over time in Russia
becomes and remains flat in 2004. GDP per capita in Russia (and in the panel)
in 2004 still remained lower than in the industrialized countries (IMF, 2007), yet
after a certain income level was reached, life satisfaction responded only weakly, if
at all, to income increases. Thus, the process of adaptation to higher income levels
articulated by Easterlin (1974) and modeled by Clark et al. (2008) that results in a
flattening of the life satisfaction curve over time can occur even if the income level in
that country is relatively low. It would, thus, appear that the key to adaptation is
not necessarily a process at the end of which a country enters the ranks of relatively
rich countries, but rather a process during which individuals are subjected to a con-
tinuous change in their own income and in the income of others over a sufficiently
long period.
In addition, the trajectory of satisfaction with economic conditions mimics that
of life satisfaction, staying below the latter for the whole period in which the satis-
faction question is asked. The reported score of satisfaction with life is equal to the
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Figure 2.1: Satisfaction with Life, Satisfaction with Economic Conditions, Log of
Real Income, Log of Real Aspirations.
reported score of satisfaction with the economic conditions in 46.3% of the cases,13
greater in 44.2% of the cases, and smaller in only 9.5% of the cases. This suggests
that individuals are able to differentiate between satisfaction with life in general
and satisfaction with economic conditions. This differentiation makes satisfaction
with economic conditions a variable worth studying alongside life satisfaction, as
one might expect these two variables to respond differently to significant life events.
Some of the appeal of the happiness economics literature is based on the
assumption that “measures of self-reported subjective well-being can serve as proxies
for utility” (Frey and Stutzer, 2002). In addition, when the subject of inquiry is the
relationship between income and happiness, the latter is often treated as a proxy
for “utility from income” (Clark et al., 2008). Herein lies the significance of the
variable measuring satisfaction with economic conditions.
13In a pooled dataset across all years.
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Like satisfaction with life, satisfaction with economic conditions is bound to
capture the effect of regional economic conditions, such as the fact that one might
work in a certain profession and other non-individual parameters. Unlike the former,
however, it helps remove the effect of non-economic variables such as relationship,
family, climate and political situation. Since it narrows the response down to capture
only the effect of economic events, satisfaction with economic conditions could be a
better proxy for “utility from income” than satisfaction with life in general.
2.4 Aspirations, Adaptation and Social Compar-
ison
Measuring income aspirations has proved to be a formidable task for researchers and
no widely accepted method is yet established. Easterlin (2003a) measures them by
using individuals’ stated views on which big-ticket consumption goods they think
are necessary to have a good life. The responses are generated by handing the re-
spondent a card with a list of 24 items, 10 of which are big-ticket consumption goods
that range “. . . from a home, car, and television set to travel abroad, a swimming
pool, and a vacation home,” and asking: “When you think of the good life – the life
you’d like to have, which of the things on this list, if any, are part of that good life
as far as you personally are concerned?”.
Stutzer (2004) approximates aspirations in two ways, both of which differ
from Easterlin’s “big-ticket consumption goods” approach. The first is through an
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income evaluation question similar to the one posed by Van Praag (1971). The
question is stated as follows: “What income would you indicate as good or bad in
your circumstances? Please try to state what income per month (before taxes) for
your entire household you consider to be: ‘very bad,’ ‘bad,’ ‘insufficient,’ ‘sufficient,’
‘good’, and ‘very good’,” where the options are listed separately. Stutzer uses the
income stated under the “sufficient” option as his first aspirations proxy. His second
aspirations proxy is provided by the answers to the minimum income question, stated
as: “What household income per month would you consider an absolute minimum
in order to make ends meet and without running into debt even if you reduce
your needs to a minimum? We do not only mean housekeeping allowance but all
essentials, including insurance, rent, taxes and so on.” Stutzer argues that capturing
aspirations through a direct, monetary approach is at least as reasonable as using
the “big-ticket consumption goods” approach which fails to take into account the
different conceptions that individuals might have of the prices of these goods.
This paper adopts a similar strategy to Stutzer’s and captures aspirations us-
ing the income levels provided as an answer to the following question: “In your
opinion how much money would be needed per month for your family to live nor-
mally?” This question is very similar to a reduced version of the income evaluation
question above. Here, “the amount of money necessary to live normally” is the only
amount respondents are asked to provide their judgment on. In contrast to the
Minimum Income Question, this question does not ask for a valuation of the min-
imum income necessary to make ends meet; instead it uses the rather loose term,
“normally,” which should capture individuals’ valuation of the income necessary
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to attain their (self-defined) mean expected welfare, i.e. their income aspiration
level. In addition, in Stutzer (2004) the analysis of the determinants of aspirations
is based on responses to this question from one single year.14 This paper estimates
the aspiration-formation process using individual data collected in three consecutive
years, from 2000 to 2002.15 This allows controlling for unobservable differences in
the respondents’ perception of aspirations by employing an individual fixed-effects
analysis. Most importantly, it enables a better assessment of the effect of adaptation
and social comparison by exploring how aspirations respond to changes in individual
income as well as relevant others’ income.
An inspection of the data shows that the values provided as an answer to the
question above are considerably higher than individuals’ monthly income. Rather
than considering it as a question about the minimum required income to get by,
the respondents adopted a more generous interpretation of “living normally” and
perceived it as a question about their aspired income level. This supports viewing
the question as measuring income aspirations.
This section explores the determinants of income aspirations, in particular
the relationship between aspirations and the processes of social comparison and
adaptation. These processes, described in detail in the following subsections, are
considered to be the driving force behind aspiration increases and their subsequent
effect on life satisfaction (Easterlin, 2003b). The income aspirations function 2.1
depends on reference group income, mean income of the district in which the survey
14Stutzer (2004), however, has data for two consecutive years for the minimum income question,
which he uses to complement the aspirations analysis.
15As previously mentioned, the analysis includes only individuals that remain in the panel for
at least two consecutive years.
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was conducted,16 and individual income.
lnY ∗it = λ lnYit + µ lnY
mkt
it + η lnY
dis
it + πXit + ci + uit (2.1)
Aspirations are denoted as Y ∗it and individual income as Yit. Both income
and aspirations are in real terms and have been deflated using regional consumer
price indices, reflecting possible differences in the cost of living across regions. The
variables Y mktit and Y
dis
it are two different measures of reference group income (de-
scribed below) that aim at capturing the effect of social comparison on aspirations.
Income aspirations are quite likely to be correlated with unobservable personality
traits such as self-esteem or optimism, hence an individual fixed effect denoted by
ci is included. In addition, a fixed-effects estimation allows capturing the response
of aspirations to changes in individual income and reference group income. Xit is a
set of additional controls.
2.4.1 Social Comparison and Reference Group Income
Social comparison has been defined as “comparing oneself with others in order to
evaluate or enhance some aspects of the self” (Suls et al., 2002). In economic lit-
erature it has been studied as a phenomenon that contributes to a relative notion
of utility that depends also on the income and consumption level of relevant oth-
ers, often defined as a reference group. As such, it received early attention in the
16The original notation from the translated questionnaires is “site.” A site is a representative
cluster of (on average) 42 households from the same district. Thus, the average income level in this
sample is a fairly good proxy for the income level of community members one is likely to interact
with on a daily basis, regardless of their education or profession.
30
works of Veblen (1899) and Duesenberry (1949), and has been revived by recent
work in happiness economics. A higher income and consumption level of relevant
others have been assumed to have a positive effect on aspirations (Easterlin, 2003b;
Stutzer, 2004). The subset of “relevant others” that provide a benchmark for social
comparison could be realistically17 defined as community members one is likely to
interact with (Stutzer, 2004) or individuals with similar job market characteristics
(Clark and Oswald, 1996).18
This paper tries to capture the social comparison effect on aspirations through
two separate variables that reflect two comparison or reference groups. The first
group is based on one’s broadly defined job market characteristics, i.e. gender, ed-
ucation, age group, profession and the region in which one lives. The “profession”
variable is categorized according to the one-digit occupational code list (Interna-
tional Standard Classification of Occupations) and the “region” variable denotes
one of the eight major regions of Russia.
Similar to Senik (2004), this paper first predicts the real individual income
based on one’s job market characteristics as described above.19
Yit = f(gender, age group, education, profession, region)
Y mktit = predicted(Yit)
Then the post-estimation predicted individual income, Y mktit , is obtained. As
17Non-realistic definitions could include very rich people (Veblen, 1899), pop-stars, professional
athletes etc.
18Senik (2004) also defines the income reference (social comparison) group as individuals with
similar job market characteristics who live in the same region.
19Also included in the estimation is a time period control.
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this predicted income represents the income one would expect individuals with sim-
ilar attributes to earn, it is used as a proxy for the income of the reference group as
defined above and is referred to as market-based reference group income.
The second group that can act as a comparison benchmark are community
members one interacts with frequently. To capture the effect of comparison with
that group, the mean real income of a survey sample from a particular district, Y disit ,
is compiled. This sample is defined as a “survey site” and is a representative cluster
of (on average) 42 households from the same district. The mean district income is
compiled separately for each individual and excludes the individual’s own income.
The average income level in this cluster is a fairly good estimate for the income
level of community members an individual is likely to interact with on a daily basis,
regardless of education or profession. Hence, it is included as the second measure
of reference group income when estimating equation 2.1 above and is referred to as
proximity-based reference group income.
2.4.2 Adaptation
The psychology literature defines adaptation as the process that results in a reduced
effect of repeated stimuli (Frederick and Loewenstein, 1999). In describing the role
of income increases in the adaptation process, Easterlin (1974, 2003b) argues that,
although initially an income increase would have a positive effect on satisfaction,
individuals internalize this increase into the formation of expectations of future in-
come (aspirations) with the result that they need an even higher income to maintain
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the initial increase in satisfaction. Hence, adaptation to income increases is argued
to have a negative effect on satisfaction through the increase in aspirations. This
paper, similar to Stutzer (2004), controls for the effect of adaptation on aspirations
by including the natural logarithm of real individual income among the regressors.
The fixed-effects estimation used in this paper ensures that the income coefficient
captures the adaptation of aspirations to individual income changes.
Xit consists of several indicator variables pertaining to employment and re-
lationship status. The fixed-effects estimation limits the controls to only variables
that change across time periods for a given individual. Education and profession,
apart from displaying minimum individual variation across years, are also used to
predict market-based reference group income, so they are excluded to avoid multi-
collinearity.
2.4.3 Results
Summary statistics are presented in Table 2.2. The regression results (Table 2.3)
indicate the presence of a weak adaptation effect on income aspirations. A 10%
increase in real income translates into only an approximately 0.1% increase in in-
come aspirations, suggesting that changes in individual income are only minimally
internalized into the aspiration formation process.
Social comparison, on the other hand, appears to have a strong effect on
income aspirations. This paper finds that both reference group income measures
have a positive and significant effect on income aspirations. A 10% increase in
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market-based reference group income is associated with a 2.3% increase in aspi-
rations, whereas a 10% increase in site income is associated with a 2.5% increase
in aspirations. This suggests that both comparison to individuals in the same job
market cohort and comparison with individuals living in the same area are equally
strong channels through which social comparison affects aspirations. In addition,
the proximity-based reference group income is constructed without regard to con-
tact with neighbors,20 which makes exposure rather than interaction more likely to
be the case behind its effect on aspirations. In sum, the results indicate that “keep-
ing up with the neighboring Joneses” provides as strong a motivation in shaping
aspirations as the income earned by one’s job market cohort. Employment appears
to have a positive effect on aspirations, whereas the effect of getting divorced is
negative.
Overall, the results support the conclusion that both adaptation and social
comparison have a significant effect on aspirations. However, the adaptation effect is
minimal and the strongest agent that shapes income aspirations in transition Russia
is social comparison. This is somewhat surprising, as Stutzer (2004), using Swiss
data, estimates that own income has about twice as high an effect on aspirations
as proximity-based reference group income.21 This difference could be an indicator
that the aspiration formation process can differ quite substantially across countries
that are at different stages of development. Unfortunately, to the best knowledge
20Stutzer (2004) makes use of a question that inquires into contact with neighbors and uses it
as a proxy for interaction.
21Stutzer (2004) performs an OLS estimation and this paper uses fixed-effects. The results of an
OLS estimation that includes lagged income still show that the effect of past and present income
is very low when compared to the effect of both reference group incomes.
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of the author, Stutzer (2004) is the only other empirical work that estimates the
aspiration formation process, so a comparison with other countries is not possible.
2.4.4 Aspirations in Different Age Groups
The adjustment of aspirations to changes in one’s or relevant others’ income is a
process that essentially translates information into expectations. While this process
might reflect unobservable character traits and evolve differently across individuals,
it is also fair to assume that this process might differ across age groups. Thus,
aspirations of individuals with a longer history of economic activity and employment
are likely to be shaped in a different way than those of younger individuals that have
only been part of the workforce for a relatively short time. To test this assumption,
the regressions described above are run separately for three age groups: individuals
below the age of 35, individuals between the ages of 36 and 55, and individuals
above the age of 55. The results are presented in Table 2.4.
The results show that adaptation does not affect the aspiration formation of
the individuals above the age of 55. Income changes only have a significant effect on
the aspirations of the younger and the middle-aged. Similarly, the effect of market-
based reference group income is significant only for the younger and middle-aged
individuals. Proximity-based reference group income affects the aspirations of both
categories roughly to the same extent as does market-based reference group income.
However, the effect of both reference group incomes is about 50% higher among the
middle-aged than among the younger, suggesting that aspirations of individuals in
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this age group respond more strongly to social comparison. As regards individuals
older than 55, their aspirations are only affected by the income of people living in
their proximity.
Marital or relationship status also affects aspirations differently among the
three age groups. Being divorced has a negative effect only on the aspirations of the
youngest group, whereas living together has a positive effect only on the aspirations
of the middle-aged. Quite interestingly, becoming unemployed has a positive effect
on the aspirations of the younger individuals, suggesting that this group does not
view unemployment as a lasting phenomenon and does not revise its aspirations
downwards.22
The results from Table 2.4 indicate distinctly different patterns of aspiration
formation among the three age groups. Most importantly, “keeping up with the
Joneses” is the only channel through which social comparison affects aspirations
among older individuals. The income of individuals with similar job-market char-
acteristics is only important for the aspiration formation process of younger and
middle-aged individuals. As people grow older and have more work (and life) ex-
perience, the income of individuals with similar qualifications ceases to provide any
signal as regards their own income aspirations and they only care about attaining
an income and consumption level comparable with that of their neighbors.
22The two other groups do, but the effect is not significant.
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2.5 The Effect of Income and Aspirations on Sat-
isfaction
2.5.1 Model
This section examines the factors that affect satisfaction and tests for the effect
of aspirations on satisfaction (hedonic adaptation). The focus is on two depen-
dent variables, “satisfaction with life in general” and “satisfaction with economic
conditions.” As discussed in Section 2.3, the index scores for satisfaction with life
and satisfaction with economic conditions suggest that the two are not perfect sub-
stitutes. Instead, individuals are able to process the two respective questions as
distinct questions that try to capture their reactions to two different situations and
hence, provide different answers. The life satisfaction scores are, on average, 20%
higher than the scores provided for satisfaction with economic conditions. As such,
apart from exploring the correlation between the two different satisfaction indices
and various life events, the research question that this paper tries to address is:
Do these two satisfaction scores react differently to different life events and why?
Particularly and more importantly, does each satisfaction score react differently to
changes in aspirations?
The psychology literature on subjective well-being is nearly unanimous in as-
serting that fixed personality traits such as extroversion and self-esteem (Diener
et al., 1999) have a significant effect on life satisfaction. However, these individ-
ual traits are unobservable, so in order to remove the potential bias of these traits
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on the estimators, it is necessary to employ an estimation method that uses the
within-individual variation of the regressors over time. This is accomplished by us-
ing the ordered probit version of the Chamberlain random effects model, allowing





itβ + ci + uit, uit|Xi ∼ N(0, 1). (2.2)
LS∗it is latent life satisfaction, captured by LSit, an ordered variable that takes
integer values from 1 to 5 and is related to LS∗it through the threshold model (3),
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where a higher value indicates a higher satisfaction level.
LSit =

1 if LS∗it ∈ (−∞, λ1)
2 if LS∗it ∈ [λ1, λ2)
3 if LS∗it ∈ [λ2, λ3)
4 if LS∗it ∈ [λ3, λ4)
5 if LS∗it ∈ [λ4,∞)
(2.3)
X ′it is a vector of observable characteristics, such as income, aspirations, age,
education, employment status, and asset ownership.
ci is time-invariant individual characteristics, related to the observable char-
23See the Appendix for further details.
24In this specification, the thresholds (λj) pertaining to the relationship between the latent
dependent variable and the observed satisfaction index are not individual-specific and are treated





iγ + αi (2.4)
where X̄i is the average of Xit over time and αi|Xi ∼ N(0, σα). The latent





iγ + αi + uit (2.5)
where ai and ui = (ui1 . . . uiT ) are independent conditional on Xi, αi|Xi ∼
N(0, σα) and ui|Xi ∼ N(0, IT ).
Based on the results from Section 2.3 and similar to Stutzer (2004), this pa-
per assumes that relative income concerns are already internalized in individuals’
aspiration formation process. Thus, this paper only includes the variable that cap-
tures aspirations in the regression with life satisfaction as the dependent variable.
Following Diener and Suh (1997), Diener et al. (1999), and Stutzer (2004), the vari-
ables age, education, marital status and employment status25 are included among
the covariates. Also included is ownership of durables to help assess the effect of
accumulated wealth.
The equation that relates satisfaction with economic conditions to the same
set of covariates can be written in a similar way:
25Indicator variables are generated for employed, unemployed and self-employed individuals.





es + X̄ ′iγ
es + αesi + u
es
it (2.6)
ES∗it is latent satisfaction with economic conditions, income, aspirations and
the rest of the covariates are denoted in the same way. The superscript es is added
to denote that the coefficients are different from those in equation 2.5.
2.5.2 Results
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 present the determinants of satisfaction with life and with eco-
nomic conditions, respectively. Both tables show the results of a simple random-
effects and a Chamberlain random-effects estimation. The following discussion fo-
cuses on the results of the Chamberlain random-effects estimation. Both tables show
that income has a positive and significant effect on life satisfaction. The results also
show that the two indices of satisfaction respond rather differently to changes in
the main variable of interest, income aspirations. Income aspirations have a posi-
tive and significant effect on life satisfaction but a small and insignificant effect on
satisfaction with economic conditions.
Material aspirations are widely argued to have a negative effect on life satis-
faction (Easterlin, 2001a). Similarly, Stutzer (2004) uses a measure of aspirations
very similar to the one used in this paper and finds that higher aspirations have a
negative effect on life satisfaction.
However, the results from Table 2.5 show that life satisfaction in Russia does
not respond to aspirations in the way predicted and tested by Easterlin (1973, 2001a,
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2003b) and Stutzer (2004). On the contrary, higher aspirations have a positive and
significant effect on life satisfaction. Essentially, this means that people who want
more in a general sense are happier than those who want less. This paper argues
that this is caused by the “information effect” inherent in the aspiration formation
process.
Section 2.4 of this paper finds that social comparison is a stronger mechanism
in shaping aspirations than adaptation. Aspirations are positively affected by in-
creases in both individual income and (both types of) reference group income but
the effect of the latter is considerably stronger. Reference group income can act
as a comparison benchmark, but it can also carry an important information value
as regards one’s expected future income (Hirschman and Rothschild, 1973; Senik,
2004), especially in developing countries that experience high income growth rates
as compared to developed countries. The intuition is straightforward, particularly as
regards market-based reference group income. Even if one is not earning as much as
the average individual with the same job market characteristics, the income earned
by the latter could be taken as an indicator of the income one is likely to earn in the
near future. Using the Hirschman and Rothschild metaphor, it reflects the belief
that, if most relevant others are “moving forward,” the income and opportunities
must be increasing, so one can aspire to and expect a higher income for oneself.
As such, an increase in aspirations can reflect not only higher standards one aspires
to, but also more optimistic expectations about future income. Thus, the cogni-
tive process through which income aspirations are projected onto life satisfaction
is shaped by two main components, the comparison effect and the information ef-
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fect (Senik, 2004). The comparison effect, which Easterlin has focused on, reflects
the relative nature of utility and has a negative influence on life satisfaction. The
information effect emphasized by Hirschman and Rothschild reflects the internaliza-
tion of available knowledge in predicting future income and affects life satisfaction
positively.
The results of the empirical analysis of this paper indicate that the informa-
tion effect embedded in individuals’ income aspirations dominates the comparison
effect. Aspirations have a positive influence on life satisfaction due to the associated
higher expectations about future income. These results support the argument of
Hirschman and Rothschild (1973) and the conclusions of Senik (2004), who finds
that reference group income26 has a positive effect on life satisfaction and attributes
this relationship to the information effect. As such, it could be said that the reaction
patterns of life satisfaction in Russia ten years into the transition process are close
to the patterns assumed by Hirschman and Rothschild for developing countries.
If one extrapolates from the Russian example and accepts these results as
representative of countries in the aftermath of significant change or reform, certain
policy implications would follow. If individuals are not concerned about the fact
that others are earning more, but use that information as a predictor of their own
future earnings, governmments in these countries should not place too much impor-
tance on redistributive policies. Instead, they should use their limited resources on
expenditure areas that generate economic growth. This would mean that expendi-
26The reference group income Senik uses is similar to the market-based reference group income
from this paper.
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ture categories such as education and infrastructure investment should make up for
a relatively larger chunk of the budget than social security expenditures.
On the other hand, the fact that the two satisfaction indices respond rather
differently to changes in aspirations is not that surprising. The data overview in
Section 2.3 suggested that a significant number of respondents display attitudes rep-
resentative of “there’s more to life than money” and that satisfaction with life in
general can capture a much broader feeling than utility from income or utility from
consumption. Furthermore, transition Russia went through multiple simultaneous
processes of political, societal and institutional change. Democratic institutions, free
speech, a wider range of consumption goods, and abounding professional opportu-
nities are among the institutional changes with impacts on how individuals perceive
life and satisfaction that can reach well beyond their economic implications. Higher
income aspirations only have a positive effect on life satisfaction. Satisfaction with
economic conditions seems to be affected more by the “here and now” and is not
influenced by the higher income expectations embedded in the aspirations variable.
The effects of the other covariates on satisfaction are similar across both in-
dices. Being unemployed is negatively associated with both indices, whereas being
employed has no significant effect on either of them. This suggests that once the in-
come effect is accounted for, being employed per se does not significantly contribute
to any of the satisfaction measures. Education is positively correlated only with
life satisfaction, suggesting that education adds to satisfaction beyond its economic
implications. Almost all the variables pertaining to marital status have a negative
effect on life satisfaction. This could be due to the fact that the excluded category
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is “never married” and a large number of the younger individuals, who on average
report a higher satisfaction with life, belong to this category.
2.6 Conclusion
A number of studies, notably Easterlin (1974, 2003b) have found that in developed
countries life satisfaction in the long run is essentially unresponsive to increases
in income. The explanation provided stressed the constantly adapting nature of
aspirations to changes in income as the main reason for the lack of increase in life
satisfaction. Social comparison and adaptation have a positive effect on aspirations,
whose increase has a negative effect on life satisfaction, thereby canceling out any
initial increase in satisfaction due to the increase in income (Easterlin, 2003b). These
results, however, have been challenged by a number of recent studies that show that
life satisfaction is positively correlated to income accross individuals, countries and
time periods. This paper adds to the latter group and shows that in transition Russia
income does have a positive effect on satisfaction, especially when the income level is
still relatively low. The data from the Russian Panel show that life satisfaction hits
a flat portion during the late phase of transition, suggesting that the effect of social
comparison and adaptation might materialize after individuals have been exposed
to income fluctuations for a sufficiently long period.
Evaluating the aspiration formation process is one of the purposes of this
paper and a closer analysis of panel data from the beginning of this decade in
Russia shows that the effect of adaptation on income aspirations is weak and the
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main factor behind the increases in aspirations is social comparison. The effects of
proximity-based reference group income and market-based reference group income
are of comparable magnitude, suggesting that the income of individuals one is in
constant interaction with is as important to one’s aspirations formation process as
is the income of individuals with similar job market characteristics. In addition, the
effects of the two reference group income measures vary across age groups. Both
reference group income measures have a significant effect on the aspirations of young
and middle-aged individuals, but among older individuals aspirations are affected
only by proximity-based reference group income.
In a departure from results of previous studies (Stutzer, 2004), this paper finds
that aspirations have a positive effect on life satisfaction. This can be explained by
the income expectations embedded in aspirations; increases in aspirations may re-
flect not only higher needs and consumption standards, but also a higher expected
income. Hirschman and Rothschild (1973) argue that in a developing country a
higher income of relevant others can act a positive signal about one’s own expected
income and have a positive effect on life satisfaction. The aspiration-centered anal-
ysis in this paper supports that argument. Individuals use the income of relevant
others to form their aspirations, which come to contain income expectations. The
higher income expectations embedded in aspirations cause the latter to have a pos-
itive effect on life satisfaction.
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Table 2.2: Data Summary
Variable No. Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Satisfaction w/ economic conditions 27969 2.135078 1.0589
Life satisfaction 27914 2.625779 1.124769
Real aspirations 26371 13351.71 24590.83
Real income 27373 1631.51 3102.018
Age 28119 43.19652 19.158
Married 33708 0.424647 0.4942966
Living together, not married 33708 0.0693307 0.2540195
Divorced 33708 0.0548831 0.2277553
Widowed 33708 0.1210692 0.3262125
Employed 33708 0.4110894 0.4920387
Unemployed 33708 0.1297615 0.3360458
Self-employed 33708 0.0378545 0.1908471
Education 33708 1.951139 1.554887
Gender 32400 0.4204012 0.493631
Regional CPI 33708 115.6353 3.675901
Owns car 28096 0.3141728 0.4641939
Owns other apartment 28079 0.0638556 0.2444998
Owns dacha 28088 0.2048206 0.4035776
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Table 2.3: Determinants of Aspirations: Adaptation and Social Comparison
Dependent variable: Income Aspirations (ln)
Age 0.00520*
[0.00]
Present individual income 0.01197***
[0.00]
Market-based reference group income 0.23142***
[0.02]




















Standard errors in brackets.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 2.4: Determinants of Aspirations: Adaptation and Social Comparison by Age
Groups
Dep. variable: Income Aspirations (ln) Age Group
Younger than 35 Between 36 and 55 Older than 55
Age 0.08344*** 0.04627*** 0.07639**
[0.01] [0.01] [0.03]
Present individual income 0.01346*** 0.01007** -0.01820
[0.00] [0.00] [0.02]
Market-based reference group income 0.12304*** 0.18048*** 0.11533
[0.04] [0.04] [0.12]
Proximity-based reference group income 0.11173** 0.17241*** 0.23201**
[0.05] [0.04] [0.11]
Married 0.02113 0.17044 -0.02325
[0.07] [0.12] [0.49]
Living together, not married 0.04986 0.22089* 0.24330
[0.07] [0.12] [0.51]
Divorced -0.21592*** 0.09290 -0.10218
[0.08] [0.11] [0.46]
Widowed -0.21258 0.08320 -0.11036
[0.64] [0.14] [0.46]
Employed 0.12196 0.02606 0.09020
[0.08] [0.08] [0.06]
Unemployed 0.18301* -0.05565 -0.15241
[0.10] [0.09] [0.11]
Self-employed 0.01457 0.00916 -0.03492
[0.06] [0.04] [0.10]
Constant 5.09573*** 4.34553*** 1.90404
[0.33] [0.37] [1.47]
Observations 5498 6829 1246
R-squared 0.79 0.79 0.82
Standard errors in brackets.
** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 2.5: Determinants of Life Satisfaction
Dep. variable: Random-effects Chamberlain random-effects
Life Satisfaction
Real aspirations (ln) 0.07891*** 0.09238***
[0.01] [0.02]
















Owns Car 0.21922*** 0.17060***
[0.02] [0.03]
Owns other apartment 0.16219*** 0.08335*
[0.04] [0.05]
Owns dacha 0.24047*** 0.21062***
[0.02] [0.03]
Observations 25531 25531
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 2.6: Determinants of Satisfaction with Economic Conditions
Dep. variable: Random-effects Chamberlain random-effects
Satisfaction with Economic Conditions
Real aspirations (ln) -0.02034* 0.00153
[0.01] [0.02]
















Owns car 0.28874*** 0.18138***
[0.02] [0.04]
Owns other apartment 0.13180*** 0.01354
[0.04] [0.05]
Owns dacha 0.18665*** 0.19660***
[0.02] [0.03]
Observations 25597 25597
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Chapter 3
Wealth and Happiness of Nations:
The Resource Curse from a New
Angle
3.1 Introduction
The determinants of happiness have been an increasingly popular research topic
during the past decade. Several studies have focused on the effects on happiness of
income, institutional quality and freedom. A consensus has emerged that seems to
suggest that, while in industrialized countries increasing income does not contribute
to rising life satisfaction, there appears to exist a positive relationship between the
two in developing countries. Clark et al. (2008) report that happiness in industrial-
ized countries has essentially remained stable for the last three decades, while real
income has almost doubled. Oswald (1997) finds that in both Western Europe and
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the United States the average level of satisfaction with life has risen very slightly.
On the other side, Frijters et al. (2004) find that in Eastern Germany life satisfac-
tion has increased significantly in from 1991 to 2002 and the rising income has had
a significant and positive effect on happiness.
Cross-country studies such as Inglehart et al. (2008) find a significant cor-
relation between development and happiness. In another cross-country study, Di
Tella et al. (2003) find that, after controlling for country fixed effects, happiness is
strongly correlated with present and lagged GDP per capita. Deaton et al. (2003)
also finds a strong cross-country relationship between per capita GDP and life sat-
isfaction. Better institutions also seem to have a positive effect on life satisfaction.
Inglehart et al. (2008) and Frey and Stutzer (2000) find that institutional variables,
such as free choice and possibilities of individual participation have a significant and
positive effect on happiness. Furthermore, Alesina et al. (2004) and Graham and
Felton (2006) find that inequality has a negative effect on happiness.
The studies listed above are the most prominent of a burgeoning literature
that is increasingly enabling a better understanding of the interaction between in-
come, institutions and life satisfaction. However, what remains unexplored is the
relationship between accumulated capital, natural resources and life satisfaction.
Accumulated wealth, natural or produced, reflects a country’s long term productiv-
ity and institutional quality and captures the effect of national wealth in a way that
income cannot. Furthermore, the ability to distinguish between produced and nat-
ural capital, as well as between different sources of natural capital, enables a review
of the effect of the resource curse on national well-being from a different perspective.
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The research on the relationship between natural resources and economic and
institutional performance has been gravitating towards the conclusion that natural
resource abundance is likely to have a negative effect on economic growth (Sachs
and Warner, 1995), contributing to the so-called resource curse theory. Ross (2001)
and Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) also find that oil and mineral resources
have a negative impact on institutional development. Murshed (2003) and Isham
et al. (2005) draw the distinction between economies with point-based resources
and those with diffuse resources, finding that the resource curse is more likely to
describe the state of affairs in the former.
This paper seeks to bridge the gap between the life satisfaction literature and
the natural resource literature. It does so by combining data from a newly available
wealth database from the World Bank (World Bank, 2006) and the 2008 Gallup
World Poll (Gallup, Inc., 2009),1 and gauging the effect of produced and natural
wealth on life satisfaction.
We find that both produced and natural wealth have a positive and significant
on life satisfaction. However, after disaggregating natural wealth into extracted and
non-extracted wealth, we find that only non-extracted wealth has a positive effect,
whereas the effect of extractive wealth is insignificant. Puzzling as these results
might appear, they do not contradict the prevailing wisdom in the area.
A country affected by the resource curse will typically be characterized by a
combination of overinvestment in the resource-rich sector and underinvestment in
other sectors, high exposure to commodity price fluctuations and concentration of
1Summary Statistics are presented in Tables B.1 and B.2 in the Appendix.
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economic and political influence in the hands of small elites. And the resource curse
typified by these features is likely to negatively affect life satisfaction in a coun-
try through the limitations in investment, employment and political participation
opportunities.
However, not all resource riches need to lead to a resource curse. As argued
by Acemoglu et al. (2001) and demonstrated by Isham et al. (2005), conditions
that facilitate a more equitable distribution of investment and income (such as land
abundance or soil quality) need not be conducive to economic and political insti-
tutions similar to those experienced by resource curse countries. It is the existence
of natural wealth that is highly valued in international markets (such as oil or gas)
and can only be taken advantage through extractive industries where ownership is
more likely to be concentrated in a few hands that will be more likely to lead to
resource curse conditions.
This paper finds no resource curse effect on life satisfaction. On the other
side, there is a significant “bliss” effect, but only as regards non-extracted wealth,
which is more likely to provide positive spillovers for other sectors and offer more
participation opportunities for a larger portion of society. Freedom in people’s life
also has a positive and significant effect, whereas the effect of the place religion has
in daily life is only marginally positive. Section 3.2 continues with a data overview
and descriptive statistics. Section 3.3 lays down the model and discusses the results,
and Section 3.4 concludes.
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3.2 Data Overview
3.2.1 The Gallup Survey
The life satisfaction data is provided by the World Poll run by the Gallup Orga-
nization in 2008 (Gallup, Inc., 2009). The survey samples were probability-based
and nationally representative, and the survey questionnaires included a standard
set of core questions around the world. This paper makes use of the questions that
were part of global core set. The questionnaires included, among others, a number
of questions on well-being, health, social issues, and religion and ethics. The 2008
Gallup survey reports life satisfaction scores from 150 countries, representing about
95% of the world’s population. This is a significant expansion from the group of 55
countries covered in the early 2000’s wave of the World Values Survey, and most
of the added countries are developing countries. Figure 3.1 below reports the mean
life satisfaction scores from all the countries in the survey.
Similar to the conclusions from Deaton (2008), the global life satisfaction map
looks quite similar to an income map. Europeans, North Americans and Australians
are relatively happy, whereas Africa hosts the countries with the lowest satisfaction
scores. The obvious outlier is the Eastern Europe, where individuals are especially
unhappy given the GDP per capita level. Results from both the 2006 Gallup World
Poll and the World Values Survey underscore the same exception, suggesting that
the post-communist transition might have an impact on life satisfaction that goes
beyond the correlation with income. The increased inequality and uncertainty as
well as higher pre-transition expectations could be cited as possible causes. In addi-
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Figure 3.1: Life Satisfaction Across the World
tion, it could well be the case that the comparison group for Eastern Europeans is
not countries with similar or lower income levels, but the richer and more prosperous
Western Europe in whose proximity they are located. The same trend is obvious also
in Figure B.1 in the appendix, which reports the percentage of individuals satisfied
with the standard of living.
3.2.2 The World Bank Wealth Database
While the effect of income on life satisfaction has been inquired into in both cross-
country and within-country studies, the effect of wealth has not received any atten-
tion. It was Samuelson (1961) who argued that, rather than income or consumption,
it is wealth that matters more for welfare and “. . . the only valid approximation to a
measure of welfare comes from computing wealth-like magnitudes not income mag-
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nitudes. . . ” The very same logic resonates with the authors of this paper, as it
can similarly be argued that life satisfaction will depend less on per capita income
as measured at a particular point in time then on the total accumulated wealth
of a society. The latter reflects better on the development stage of a society and
its corollaries as regards the quality of a country’s infrastructure, public services,
educational institutions and the sum total of economic and non-economic factors
that make life in a particular country more or less satisfactory. Hence, the focus of
this paper is the relationship between wealth variables and life satisfaction.
The wealth variables used in this paper are supplied by a novel World Bank
database that reflects several years of data collection and computation from World
Bank economists. All wealth variables are on a per capita basis. In that database,
total wealth is measured “by assuming a future consumption stream and calculating
the present value. . . ” This methodology corrects for unsustainable consumption pat-
terns, which is indicated by negative net savings levels, by subtracting the amount
of negative savings to obtain a sustainable consumption path. The stock of pro-
duced capital (wealth) is calculated through the perpetual inventory method. In
their definition “produced capital is the sum of machinery, equipment, and struc-
tures (including infrastructure).” Natural capital is defined as “the sum of non-
renewable resources. . . , cropland, pastureland, forested areas, and protected areas.”
The value of the natural resources is calculated by computing the present value of
resource rents over an assumed lifetime. Finally, intangible capital is calculated as
the residual between total wealth and the sum of produced and natural capital.
This paper will focus on the effect of different types of wealth on life satis-
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faction, so the stock of produced and natural capital is of particular interest. As
can be seen from Figure B.2 in the appendix, the stock of produced capital is a
potentially good predictor of life satisfaction. That is not the case with natural
capital (Figure 3.2 below), in which case the relationship seems to be more com-
plicated. There are high natural capital countries that figure among the relatively
satisfied countries, such as North American and Scandinavian countries, as there are
a number of Middle Eastern and Sub-Saharan African countries that are relatively
low-satisfaction countries. The relationship between various types of natural capital
and life satisfaction will be closely inquired into in the section that follows.
Figure 3.2: Natural Capital per Capita
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3.3 Wealth, Produced Capital, Natural Capital
and Life Satisfaction
Samuelson (1961) and the team of World Bank economists that compiled the exten-
sive report Where is the Wealth of Nations (2006) argue that “computing wealth-like
magnitudes” is a better approximation of welfare than income. It can be argued
that the total accumulated wealth in a society is a better indicator of its economic
achievements and its ability to deliver welfare. Furthermore, wealth-like magni-
tudes highlight even more the difference between rapidly growing emerging market
economies and industrialized countries. This makes the relationship between wealth
and life satisfaction a valid subject of inquiry. As regards the specification of the
relationship between wealth and satisfaction, this paper employs a similar specifi-
cation to that in Deaton (2008), which is a paper this one is closely related to and
looks into the cross-country relationship between income and average life satisfac-
tion. Deaton relates average life satisfaction in 2006 in each country i to income in
2003 and life expectancy in 2005 as follows:
LSi = α + β1 lnYi + β2∆Yi + β3LEi + β4∆LEi + εi
where Yi is per capita income (from Heston et al. (2009)) and LE is life expectancy.
Deaton also adds the income growth rate from 2000 to 2003 and from 1990 to 2000,
as well as the life expectancy growth rate from 1990 to 1995. Life expectancy seems
to be a good objective indicator of the quality of health services and general life
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quality, so its inclusion seems quite sensible.
This paper relates average life satisfaction in 2008 in each country i to wealth,
life expectancy and a number of institutional variables from 2005 as follows:
LS = αi + β1 lnWi + β2∆Wi + β3LEi + β4∆LEi +Xi + εi (3.1)
where W is wealth and ∆W is the change in wealth from 2000 to 2005.2 LE is
life expectancy in 2005 and ∆LE is the change in life expectancy from 1990 to
2005. The Xi includes age dependency ratio
3 and various measures of institutional
development taken from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) (PRS Group,
2010). The institutional variables include corruption control,4 bureaucracy quality,
and democratic accountability. In addition, Xi includes the percentage of individuals
that say they can count on help from friends or relatives and the percentage of
individuals for whom religion occupies an important part in their daily life.
The ability to count on help from others can act as an indicator of the de-
velopment level of informal safety nets in a society, which would contribute to a
higher life satisfaction. One would expect ability to count on help from others to
be a crucial factor especially in countries where formal safety nets are weak and
insufficient to mitigate the effect of unexpected life events. Religion can contribute
to a better psychological coping mechanism (Clark et al., 2008) and a number of
2It would be ideal to have the change in wealth and the change in different types of accumulated
capital from 1995 to 2005. However, the latter was not compiled for a number of countries in 1995,
which would unduly restrict the sample.
3The age dependency ratio is measured as the percentage of the population older than 65.
4The variable denoted as “corruption control” in this paper is denoted as “corruption” in the
ICRG database, and a higher value measures better corruption control in a country.
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studies have pointed to the existence of a positive relationship between measures
of religiosity and life satisfaction (Kahneman et al., 1999; Greene and Yoon, 2004;
Lelkes, 2006). The estimation results are reported in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Wealth and Life Satisfaction
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3)
Average life satisfaction
Total wealth per capita (ln) 0.57397 0.37825 0.31143
[8.83]*** [4.16]*** [3.28]***
Life expectancy 0.01085 0.01722 0.00922
[1.18] [1.35] [0.76]
Change in life expectancy 1990-2005 0.0138 -0.00102 0.01487
[0.97] [0.05] [0.76]
Age dependency ratio -0.02806 -0.03267 -0.02478
[1.79]* [1.97]* [1.25]
Growth rate of total wealth 2000-2005 -0.5999 -0.38943 -0.281
[3.22]*** [1.91]* [1.46]
Corruption control 0.15283 0.14938
[2.25]** [2.24]**
Democratic accountability 0.02177 -0.00962
[0.47] [0.21]
Bureaucracy quality 0.15923 0.16554
[1.77]* [1.87]*
Count on help from others 0.02318
[3.58]***
Religion important part of daily life 0.00181
[0.54]
Constant -1.19863 -0.27981 -0.98974
[2.69]*** [0.48] [1.33]
Observations 136 119 118
R-squared 0.75 0.78 0.8
Robust t-statistics in brackets.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
As expected, the effect of total wealth on life satisfaction is positive and signif-
icant. The results from the first specification indicate that a doubling of per capita
wealth leads to an approximate increase of 0.6 units in a country’s life satisfaction
level. More prosperous countries typically have better institutions, so wealth could
capture, in part, the effect of institutions. That this is clearly the case in our data is
shown by the fact that the effect of wealth diminishes once institutions are accounted
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for. As expected, better institutions contribute to more happiness. Both control of
corruption and bureaucracy quality have a strong and positive effect on life satis-
faction. The effect of the growth rate of wealth is negative, albeit its significance
decreases as further variables are added. As argued by Deaton (2008), it is likely
that countries with the high growth rates have relatively low levels of wealth, which
would have lower life satisfaction than countries that have been rich for a relatively
long period of time. The effect of life expectancy is strongly positive and significant,
whereas the effect of changes in life expectancy is insignificant. Also insignificant
is the effect of the age dependency ratio. Being able to count on help from others
also has a positive effect, indicating that the existence of informal safety nets is a
non-negligible factor in determining subjective welfare. The effect of religiosity is
insignificant.
3.3.1 Different Types of Capital and Life Satisfaction
Table 3.1, as expected, highlights the positive relationship between wealth and life
satisfaction and between wealth and good institutions. However, the main objective
of this paper, beyond assessing the effect of wealth on life satisfaction, is to evaluate
the separate effects of accumulated produced and natural capital. The former is
the stock of capital wealth that includes the stock of machinery, equipment and
infrastructure, and the latter is a measure of natural resource wealth. One does not
to be a Marxist to understand that the stock of produced capital in a country is of
crucial importance to a country’s ability to sustain production of manufactured and
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industrial goods and engage in product and process innovation. On the other side,
natural capital endowment and the revenue that stems from it can play a significant
role in a country’s development. In other words, apart from the size of accumulated
wealth itself, its composition can also be of consequence to life satisfaction in a
country. The regression estimated to that effect is very similar to equation 3.1
above, with the difference that total wealth and its growth rate from 2000 to 2005
is replaced by produced and natural capital, and their respective growth rates over
the same periods. Table 3.2 reports the estimation results.
Table 3.2: Life Satisfaction: Produced and Natural Capital
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3)
Average life satisfaction
Produced capital per capita (ln) 0.08573 0.03221 0.03421
[3.67]*** [1.35] [1.66]*
Natural capital per capita (ln) 0.17206 0.14592 0.11919
[2.34]** [3.34]*** [3.17]***
Life expectancy 0.05426 0.04207 0.02863
[5.53]*** [3.34]*** [2.40]**
Change in life expectancy 1990-2005 -0.01414 -0.02568 -0.00348
[0.88] [1.46] [0.18]
Age dependency ratio 0.01793 -0.01826 -0.00608
[1.02] [0.98] [0.29]
Growth rate of produced capital 2000-2005 0.01139 0.02697 0.00444
[0.74] [1.10] [0.13]
Growth rate of natural capital 2000-2005 0.02162 0.01981 0.00106
[0.13] [0.12] [0.01]
Corruption control 0.25651 0.23165
[3.90]*** [3.28]***
Democratic accountability 0.01934 -0.02851
[0.42] [0.64]
Bureaucracy quality 0.2645 0.25489
[3.08]*** [3.04]***
Count on help from others 0.02401
[3.74]***
Religion important part of daily life 0.00338
[0.97]
Constant -0.59243 -0.04196 -0.93299
[0.92] [0.06] [1.20]
Observations 136 119 118
R-squared 0.65 0.78 0.8
Robust t-statistics in brackets.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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The results from Table 3.2 show that the effect of produced capital on life
satisfaction is positive. However, much like in the case of total wealth, produced
capital looses significance and its effect is reduced dramatically once the quality of
institutions is accounted for. This points to the strong correlation between accumu-
lated investment capital and good institutions. The effect of natural capital, on the
other hand, is about twice as strong and remains significant even after the addition
of the institutional variables. Furthermore, the addition of the institutional level
does not reduce the effect of natural capital by much. This indicates that good in-
stitutions are more likely to have an effect on satisfaction through produced rather
than natural capital. The effect of bureaucracy quality and corruption control re-
mains positive and significant as was the case in the specification with total wealth
as an explanatory variable. Being able to count on others for help also retains its
positive effect.
The apparent surprise that emerges from the results is the strong and positive
effect of natural resource capital on satisfaction. This would run counter to intuition,
as a number of studies have documented the negative effect of natural resources
on both institutions and economic growth. Could there be anything in natural
resource endowments that makes people happier while contributing to lower growth
and poorer institutions? Luckily there is not, and the discipline is spared another
paradox. The answer lies in further disaggregation of the natural resource wealth.
The vast majority of the studies from which the “resource curse” consensus has
emerged focus on subsoil assets such as oil, gas and minerals. To highlight the
variation in the influence of different resource types, this paper disaggregates natural
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resource wealth into cropland, pastureland, and forestry wealth on one side, and
oil, gas, coal, and minerals on the other. The second group is denoted as subsoil
resources, and the results of the regression with the natural resources disaggregated
are reported in Table 3.3 below.
Table 3.3: Life Satisfaction: Natural Capital Disaggregated
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3)
Average life satisfaction
Produced capital per capita (ln) 0.08187 0.02984 0.03187
[3.47]*** [1.27] [1.60]
Cropland, pastureland and forestry wealth per capita (ln) 0.15223 0.10714 0.08341
[2.16]** [2.18]** [2.00]**
Subsoil wealth per capita (ln) 0.01598 0.02268 0.02574
[0.85] [1.23] [1.48]
Life expectancy 0.06424 0.05057 0.0327
[6.47]*** [4.10]*** [2.66]***
Change in life expectancy 1990-2005 -0.01878 -0.03158 -0.00374
[1.06] [1.73]* [0.19]
Age dependency ratio -0.00296 -0.03055 -0.01213
[0.16] [1.61] [0.55]
Growth rate of produced capital 2000-2005 0.00713 0.02251 -0.00415
[0.34] [0.93] [0.12]
Growth rate of land and forestry wealth 2000-2005 -0.25264 -0.10674 -0.08928
[1.60] [0.69] [0.64]
Growth rate of subsoil wealth 2000-2005 0.02525 0.01101 0.0063
[0.47] [0.15] [0.09]
Corruption control 0.26644 0.23963
[3.97]*** [3.30]***
Democratic accountability 0.01365 -0.0369
[0.28] [0.76]
Bureaucracy quality 0.24086 0.22829
[2.62]** [2.55]**
Count on help from others 0.02681
[4.21]***
Religion important part of daily life 0.00391
[1.05]
Constant -0.94505 -0.17716 -1.12243
[1.18] [0.23] [1.29]
Observations 136 119 118
R-squared 0.64 0.76 0.8
Robust t-statistics in brackets.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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The results from Table 3.3 are in line with the consensus generated by the
natural resources literature. The significantly positive effect of natural resources is
almost entirely due to the cropland, pastureland and forestry resources. The effect
of the combined subsoil assets on life satisfaction is small and insignificant. As was
the case in the previous specification, produced capital looses significance and its
coefficient is reduced to about a third of itself once institutional quality is accounted
for. The effects of life expectancy and formal and informal institutions remain con-
sistently strong throughout all the regressions with different wealth disaggregation.
The difference between the effects of subsoil and above soil assets corroborates
the findings of previous studies that focus on the effect of natural resources on growth
and institutions. Murshed (2003) and Isham et al. (2005) draw attention to the
different aspects of point-based resources and diffuse resources. The countries that
are likely to be hit by the double curse of low growth and inefficient institutions
are countries with point-based resources, whose extraction is more likely to get
monopolized by the government and enable the latter to engage in rent-seeking
behavior. Van Der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2009) argue that the negative effect of
resources on growth is due to the former’s contribution to higher output volatility,
and find that diffuse resources do not contribute significantly to volatility. Goldberg
et al. (2008) use U.S. state-level data and argue (similar to Krugman (1991)) that
the negative effect of point-based resources is confined to cases where they lead to
the establishment of enclave economies with weak linkages to the rest of the country.
Whether the presence of natural resources generates enclave economies or positive
externalities and increasing returns depends, as emphasized by Krugman (1991), on
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transportation costs and the demand of the local market for said natural resources.
In this framework, diffuse natural resources such as cropland, pastureland or
forestry, are more likely to lead to a local economy with more participants, positive
externalities and stronger growth. The demand for agricultural products is, in most
cases, readily available in close proximity. The existence of conditions favorable to
production of agricultural goods can support a stronger urbanization process, which
in turns generates higher demand. The production and supply chain is generally less
monopolistic than in the case of oil and minerals, and hence less likely to contribute
to the existence of a rent-seeking government. The same factors that cause diffuse
resources to have a positive impact on growth and institutions contribute to the
former having a strong effect on life satisfaction as well, and it is possible that they
have intangible satisfaction effects that persist even as institutions are accounted
for.
Subsoil asset resources, on the other hand, are highly valued in international
markets, but not necessarily equally valued in local markets, and also not easy to
extract without significant investment. Hence subsoil resources, partly due to lower
local demand and partly due to conditions pertaining to their production and trans-
portation, are less likely to contribute to urbanization and positive externalities for
the local economy. Despite being a significant source of income for many countries,
in most cases subsoil wealth does not contribute positively to democratic institu-
tions or growth. It is this lack of contribution that causes subsoil wealth to not
have a significant effect on life satisfaction while other types of wealth, produced or
natural, affect the latter in a positive way. Another possible explanation of the dif-
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ference in impact is the fact that most diffuse resources are also renewable, whereas
subsoil resources are not. Zidansek (2007) finds a positive correlation between hap-
piness and environmental sustainability measures. Hence, the lack of a positive
impact of subsoil assets on satisfaction could also reflect concerns about sustainable
development.
However, it is important to notice that subsoil assets do not have a negative
effect on life satisfaction. The effect, albeit small and insignificant, is positive, and
increases in significance once institutions are taken into account. It just seems that
individuals would be happier if wealth were to have come in another form.
Where does that leave policy makers? It does appear that geography and
initial resource endowments have an impact on satisfaction after all. It is not possible
to significantly change a country’s resource endowment setting. If a country has
oil or gas and a climate and soil that are not favorable to agriculture, there is
not much the country can do about it. But from a policy-making perspective it
would be wise to establish and sustain good institutions and contribute to a broad-
based development, all of which have a direct or indirect impact on life satisfaction.
Furthermore, it can be argued that it is not always easy, but in most cases feasible
for a government to enact policies that promote capital accumulation in the long
run, which would also contribute to higher life satisfaction.
68
3.4 Conclusion
This paper attempts to bridge the natural resources literature and the life satisfac-
tion literature. It does so by evaluating the effect of different types of accumulated
wealth on average life satisfaction across countries. The results show that while
both produced and natural capital have a positive effect on life satisfaction, the
effect of the latter is stronger and remains significant even after accounting for the
quality of formal institutions and the existence of informal safety nets. Democratic
institutions and informal safety nets retain their positive effect on life satisfaction.
However, when natural wealth is further disaggregated into diffuse resources and
subsoil resources, the latter have no significant effect on life satisfaction. Most of
the positive effect that natural capital has is due to diffuse resources like cropland,
pastureland or forestry. Hence, echoing results from the vast literature on natural
resources, this paper finds that the same type of resource endowment that is likely
to contribute to higher growth rates and more democratic institutions is also likely
to contribute to a higher life satisfaction. Beyond the direct wealth effect, this could
be due to the diffuse resources’ contribution to a more broad-based and equitable
development, as well as their generating a higher level of positive externalities.
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Chapter 4
Blood Feuds: The Economics of a
Dismal Institution
4.1 Introduction
The institutional composition of a society, that is the network of legal, political
and economic institutions together with the set of beliefs and expectations these
institutions generate and are, in turn, supported by, has been shown to have a
substantial effect on growth and economic performance. North (1990) assesses the
importance of well-designed institutions on economic performance and Acemoglu et
al. (2001) supply a thorough analysis of the effects of different institutional setups
on the long-term economic performance of various regions in Africa, Oceania, and
the Americas that were ruled or colonized by Europeans.
Of all institutional features, a well functioning legal system and a political
entity with a strong law enforcement capacity are indispensable prerequisites for the
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existence of a well-functioning market economy; without them even the most basic
rights to security of life and property are severely under threat, rendering the proper
functioning of a market economy impossible. For a legal system to be successful,
its acceptance by every person in a given country or region is a basic condition;
it is threatened by remnant components of conflicting legal systems, which reflect
different preferences and could encourage types of behavior that run counter to the
official legal system.
This paper focuses on the effects of an informal enforcement structure on
welfare, stability and the behavior it encourages in countries or regions where it
has not been fully and successfully replaced by a modern, government-enforced
legal system. That enforcement structure is the blood feud. In the societies this
paper focuses on, it appears to be the case that, though customary law has lost its
normative power, particular types of behavior and institutions associated with it
in the past continue to exist. For instance, in Northern Albania, one of the main
study areas, although the historical customary code of conduct pertaining to many
aspects of life in a society has widely disappeared and ceased to regulate people’s
lives, the blood feud continues to exist with detrimental effects to the security of
life and property.
A blood feud consists of a chain of reciprocal killings between members of two
opposing clans and often lasts for generations. Far from being regarded as isolated
spurs of violence, anthropological research has viewed the blood feuds as an insti-
tution that has regulated violence and provided a “cohesive force” (Black-Michaud
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1972) for the societies in which they have been present throughout centuries.1 As
such, blood feuds display a number of strictly regulated features and are generally
supported by a wider set of societal norms. In Northern Albania, they have been
supported and regulated by the Kanun of Leke Dukagjini, a wide body of customary
law in existence since the middle of the 15th century. Among various Bedouin tribes
in Israel, blood feuds are regulated by a set of norms that is predominantly orally
transmitted rather than codified in writing.
Blood feuds have also been and continue to be present in Afghanistan and
Northern Pakistan (Rubin, 2002; Schoffield 2003). It is even argued that blood
feuds fueled the civil war in Afghanistan, although Nojumi (2002) rejects that ar-
gument. While there is not necessarily an established link between blood feuds and
illegal activity in all countries2 in which blood feuds have persisted, there is a con-
nection between blood feuds and organized crime in Albania and Brazil (De Souza
Mello Bicalho and Hoeffle, 2005). Some of the institutional features that support
blood feuds, such as disregard for the formal legal structure, clan discipline and
a propensity for violence could easily become valuable assets for organized crime.
Eradicating blood feuds and replacing their supporting institutions would go beyond
establishing law and order, and have deeper implications for future crime prevention,
institutional consolidation and social cohesion and for the development of a region
in general. In order to eradicate the blood feud as an institution, it is necessary to
better understand the decision-making process of feuding clans, the dynamics of the
1Section 4.3 of this paper provides a review of the ecological features present in societies with
blood feuds
2Afghanistan, Albania, Brazil, Israel, Mexico, Pakistan.
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feud’s replication in time, and the conditions under which they can be dismantled.
The major questions this paper sets out to answer include: (1) What is the
blood feud’s typical longevity? (2) How do blood feuds persist through time and
resist competition from other institutions (including government-sponsored modern
legal systems), or how are they not only “self-enforcing” but also “self-re-enforcing”
(Greif, 1994)?
There is no consensus in the literature (Middleton and Tait, 1958; Peters,
1967; Black-Michaud, 1975) on the answer to the first question - whether the blood
feud is finite or infinite. This paper introduces a model that combines both views
and demonstrates how both types of conflict can coexist in a society.
This paper focuses on collective responsibility as the main cause behind the
persistence of blood feuds and argues that only societies that have successfully com-
pleted a transition from collective to individual responsibility have been able to
eradicate blood feuds. The capacity of a society to alter its institutions in the long
run is explored by treating the institution of “collective responsibility” as endoge-
nous in an environment of changing economic opportunities. This paper concludes
that while payoffs are determined in the short run by the existing institutional struc-
ture, in the long run changes in payoffs contribute to a change in the institutional
structure.
Section 4.2 examines the implications of different definitions of blood feuds
on their longevity and tries to reconcile them. Section 4.3 explores common eco-
logical features of feud societies and factors that contribute to the emergence and
persistence of blood feuds. A model that seeks to capture the dynamics of a blood
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feud and bridge differing views from relevant anthropological theory is presented in
Section 4.4. Section 4.5 provides a non-technical discussion on the conditions under
which a society can complete a transition from a feud to non-feud equilibrium, and
Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Defining Feuds
It is difficult to find a general but precise definition of a blood feud. The following
are two definitions from Middleton and Tait (1958) and Peters (1967), respectively.
“By feud we refer to fighting between people as groups, usually undertaken as
a response to an offense, the groups being in such a relationship that although they
fight, they both accept the obligation to bring the fighting to a close there being
machinery to achieve this conclusion. . . ” (Middleton and Tait, 1958)
The blood feud is “. . . a set of relationships between two tribal groups which
are characterized by hostility whenever two or more of their members meet. These
hostilities are of a sort that cannot be terminated; feud is not a matter of a group
indulging in hostilities here at one moment and there the next, but a sequence of
hostilities, which, as far as the Bedouin are concerned, know no beginning and are
insoluble. . . It is a form of behavior associated with a specific structural order, and
it is persistent as the structural order itself; in this sense it is eternal.” (Peters,
1967)
Black-Michaud (1975) ascribes more to the second definition, refining Peters’
definition to include the feud as a provider of “the foundations of internal political
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hierarchy” and a means to engage in competition for power without necessarily
disturbing the strongly egalitarian character of the societies in which they take
place.
Both definitions stress the strictly collective, rather than individual, character
of the conflict as well as the fact that the conflict might continue well after the
individuals responsible for its initiation are dead. However, they diverge sharply
when it comes to the duration of the conflict and the possibility of termination.
Middleton and Tait seem to underestimate the fact that the conflict might deliver
some utility to both parties involved, hence it might be in their best interest to
continue it even when there exist clear opportunities to end the hostilities. Black-
Michaud and Peters, stressing the role of feuds as a “set of relationships” and a
“cohesive force”, seem to overlook the fact that, while feuds as a mode of interaction
can continue to dominate the relationships between tribal groups in a society, the
effort for reconciliation will always be present and several individual feuds might
well be short-lived. That is because the group that has “shed the last blood” might
find it optimal to seek mediation and reconciliation in order to prevent further loss
of life on their side, and sometimes the other group might find it in their best
interest to accept it. In sum, the blood feud can be defined as a well-regulated
conflict consisting of a sequence of orderly killings between two tribal groups under
conditions of collective responsibility with a possibility of the conflict ending after
each killing.
What is clear from all three definitions presented above is that blood feuds
are not similar to the occasional vendetta or isolated honor killings. Honor has
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been a prize worth fighting over, and thus a major reason for unorganized violence
in a number of societies in history, such as Medieval Europe, and the Southern
and Western “frontier” United States. Indeed, Cohen et al. (1996) find that the
Southern culture of honor has a significant effect on individuals’ reaction to offenses
and predisposition for conflict. However, with few exceptions (such as the infamous
Hatfield vs. McCoy conflict), blood feuds have not been the mode in these societies.
Hence, a strong valuation of one’s honor (status) and the obligation of preserving it
are not sufficient for the emergence and persistence of the blood feud as a central
institution. The next section lists some common features of feud societies. The
presence of these features is typically accompanied by a certain level of violence
between groups, which has a high probability of being channeled into blood feuds.
4.3 Common Sociological and Ecological Features
of Societies with Blood Feuds
Nearly all feud societies display a combination of traits that are important to under-
stand the historical, sociological and ecological context in which blood feuds emerge
and get sustained. The central role of honor and a strong notion of collective respon-
sibility have been singled out by the anthropology literature as the most essential
features of acephalous societies that develop and sustain blood feuds. This section
aims at presenting a short review of both traits as deconstructed by the anthropol-
ogy literature. Thus, the arguments below reflect and elaborate on the findings of
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this literature and are not derived from field research conducted by the author. This
paper accepts the central role of honor and collective responsibility in causing and
sustaining blood feuds and treats them as key factors in the determination of the
initial assumptions of the model in section 4.4, and the elaboration that follows is
important as regards providing a theoretical background for these assumptions.
4.3.1 Total Scarcity and the Centrality of Honor
This paper focuses on sedentary agricultural societies because in these societies
blood feuds occur in particularly violent and persistent patterns relative to nomadic
pastoral societies. In order to provide a satisfactory explanation of the central role
of honor and its implications in feuding societies, one needs to gain a better under-
standing of the action space of a conflict. In addition, it is necessary to introduce the
concept of “total scarcity” (Black-Michaud, 1975) in sedentary agricultural societies.
The agricultural societies with high occurrence and persistence of blood feuds
are typically located in mountainous, land-locked areas with scarce arable land and
population growth that outpaces the growth of agricultural production. In these
conditions, economic surplus is a virtual impossibility, hence consumption consists
only of livelihood necessities and individuals live close to subsistence level. The fact
that life is conducted on the brink of subsistence renders competition over wealth
infinitely destructive and, hence, socially undesirable. A competition between two
groups over land could lead to the destruction and extinction of one of these groups,
as there is no accumulated wealth reserve that a group could lean on once deprived
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of its land or water resources.3
Black-Michaud (1975) describes total scarcity as “...the moral, institutional
and material premise of a certain type of society in which everything felt by the
people themselves to be relevant to human life is regarded by those people as existing
in absolutely inadequate quantities.” Furthermore, not only does the society end
up in a situation where economic surplus is non-existent, but it also fails to produce
any power differentiation and subsequent institutional structure based on wealth
accumulation.
The impossibility of building a political and social hierarchy based on wealth
accumulation is part of the explanation for the occurrence of “institutional scarcity.”
Establishing and maintaining political leadership has a cost, which no group can
shoulder under conditions of total scarcity. As a result, the lack of a political elite
leads to a failure to establish adequate power institutions as well as a failure to
establish a legal framework and social order that is enforceable by these elites. In
addition, due to the ecological features that lead to the condition of total scarcity,
these areas have proven hard to conquer and control, making successful establish-
ment of sustainable power institutions by an alien agent virtually impossible.
In these conditions of total scarcity the concept of honor emerges as a proxy
for power and as a means of social differentiation (Black-Michaud, 1975). Honor
becomes a proxy for power in the sense that, by engaging in a feud to protect it,
groups and individuals give the signal that they are ready to protect their right
3It appears that an all-out conflict after which one of the clans is completely eradicated is an
extremely rare occurrence. The literature does not clearly explain why a clan would not want
to annihilate the other, apart from the shared general concern about survival in the future. As
explained in the following paragraphs, an all-out war is precisely what the blood feud prevents.
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to live in that area without actually fighting over resources, which would lead to
the destruction of at least one group. Groups are aware that both open conflict
over resources and signals of weakness can be fatal to the group. The blood feud is
therefore used as a signal of strength to avert open conflict over resources. Limiting
conflict to the sphere of honor is not just an option, but a crucial condition for
survival. Furthermore, in societies lacking an economic or political hierarchy, honor
is the only marker of status that one can change through one’s actions. In a closed,
sedentary agricultural society, competition over honor is fierce, since it is the only
marker of status.
The definition of honor in a society can be intentionally loose. Members of a
group are willing to define every conflict as a conflict over honor, since it entails the
death of a single individual (or a finite number of individuals over time), in order
to avoid open conflict over resources that could potentially lead to the destruction
of the whole group.
As a result, blood feuds arise as a “dismal institution” under conditions of
total scarcity, but they really provide an institutional structure that helps regulate
and organize violence and save the society from destruction. In these conditions,
engaging in a feud to protect and avenge one’s honor is, unlike in the case of a
duel, not just an option or an isolated individual action, but an action encouraged
and required by the society, and in fact, a necessary condition for that society to
divert conflict into a less destructive realm and survive. The concept of honor is the
intermediary that provides the foundation and generates the social consensus that
supports these institutions.
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4.3.2 Deconstructing Collective Responsibility
This paper argues that collective responsibility is the main cause of the replica-
tion dynamics of the blood feuds. Both Black-Michaud (1975) and Ginat (1987)
provide a thorough treatment of the structure of a group of agnates that shares
collective responsibility, with Ginat emphasizing the role of collective responsibility
in perpetuating feuds.
Collective responsibility can be defined as the whole group reacting to tort
or aggression committed against any individual member of the group as well as
dealing with the consequences of aggression or tort of a group member to another
party. The responsibility of the group in case of tort or aggression suffered by group
members consists of avenging the victim or negotiating the reconciliation with the
offender’s group. The responsibility of the group in case of unjustified aggression by
own group members against outsiders consists of seeking mediation and, eventually,
reconciliation, paying the blood debt (Arabic “diyya”) to the injured group and
suffering the consequences when reconciliation is rejected; namely, the group accepts
the fact that revenge can be extracted upon every member of the group and adjusts
activities accordingly.
The group of agnates or the collective bargaining unit responsible for the
consequences of actions by or against their members will henceforth be called the
clan. The same structure is called the “diyya group” among the Arabs (Ginat,
1987). The importance and functions of the clan reach well beyond the realm of
blood feuds, making its understanding crucial to explaining the dynamics of the
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blood feud.
Blood feuds are a persistent feature of societies that, due to inability to produce
ruling elites, have experienced prolonged spells of relative anarchy and lack of an
enforceable legal structure. For this reason, the clan in these societies fills the
institutional void and acquires a different set of functions and characteristics that
go beyond the traditional roles of family. In fact, in the absence of control by
government or other societal groupings, the clan has stepped in to become the most
important organizational unit of society. The main functions of the clan can be
listed as:
i) Providing security to its members: The clan retaliates against injus-
tice to any clan member, providing a deterrent to potential injurers (Ginat, 1987;
Michaud, 1975).
ii) Providing economic help in case of hardships: The clan fills the role
of a mutual insurance scheme by redistributing wealth among members in times of
need (Ginat, 1987).4
iii) Arbitrating property (or other) disputes within agnates: There is a
fair amount of intra-group disputes, for which resolution by forceful means would
undermine the survival of the whole clan. In these cases, the clan elders provide the
“in-house justice.”
iv) Providing the community with a sense of belongingness and self-identification:
The concept of nation state and identification by ethnic belongingness is fairly new
4It is unclear whether the clan has the optimal size of an insurance scheme in the above men-
tioned conditions. Perhaps, the nucleus family is too small to deliver any benefits, while the whole
village is too large of a group to be managed efficiently.
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to the Eastern Mediterranean area, as historically it was through clan membership
that individuals would identify themselves.
The benefits of clan membership are of such importance that dissociation from
the clan because of inability to comply with the requirements or expulsion in cases
of extreme misconduct would signify a loss of protection of life and property as well
as a loss of insurance. It would be practically impossible to survive in an area when
the clan expulsion is common knowledge. Cases that would merit clan expulsion
include intra-clan murder and failure to act in accordance with clan expectations
during a blood feud. For example, in a blood feud it is the responsibility of the
eldest brother of the victim to avenge a murder in the name of the clan. If one fails
to do so, one immediately singles oneself out as a member of the group that cannot
share the protection cost. In addition, one becomes a liability to the clan in the
sense that one’s behavior might have an effect on outsiders’ perception of the clan’s
toughness. If a clan is perceived as slow or unwilling to react and extract revenge,
it becomes an easy target and the survival of the whole clan is jeopardized. Hence,
such an individual (and the immediate family) would be declared “excluded” from
the group and would lose all vital benefits of clan membership.
The scope and functions of the clan clearly transcend managing the situations
that arise during a blood feud. The clan delivers a great deal of social welfare and
acquires a much broader societal significance. In fact, its extra-feud functions are
likely of greater importance than its feud-related functions. However, it exists in a
symbiotic relationship with the blood feud, which remains the basic element through
which the clan is defined. The situation is best described by Black-Michaud (1975):
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“. . . [The] feud, that is the struggle itself, is identical with the social system. It is
therefore, not an institution, but a summary of all those institutions which in other
circumstances go to make what is known as society.”
While the centrality of honor in societies characterized by total scarcity is a
major reason behind the emergence of blood feuds, collective responsibility with its
institutional implications can be singled out as a major reason for why they persist
for very long periods of time. The model presented in the next section attempts
to combine both concepts and to show how they interact in causing blood feuds to
emerge and persist. It also tries to explain the longevity and distribution of feuds in
a society at any given time, in an attempt to reconcile the two different definitions
of blood feuds and their different implications.
4.4 Model
The model outlined in this section seeks to capture the inter-clan interaction that
leads to and continues during a blood feud. The model agents are therefore clans.
Several assumptions are made to reflect that collective responsibility is the modus
operandi of the justice system in an acephalous society. It is assumed that every
individual is member of a clan (1), every clan member shares the same collective
utility function (2), every clan acts as a single rational entity conditional on the
utility function (3), and every clan is able to act according to their payoff structure
(4). The fourth assumption means that actions are well specified within a clan,
i.e. there is no uncertainty about the identity and the willingness of the individual
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member responsible to act upon a clan decision. The model is based on one devel-
oped by Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Fudenberg and Kreps (1987) to describe the
concession game between an incumbent monopolist and a potential market entrant.
In addition, to reflect the centrality of honor in feud societies, this paper postulates
that an individual’s utility depends on honor as well as income. Furthermore, it is
assumed that, although an individual’s honor is common information, clans differ
in their valuation of honor.
Production Function
Assuming a collective production function follows naturally from the “collective
responsibility” assumption. All clan members are collectively responsible for pro-
duction and protection of the output. In addition, it is postulated that the economic
activity of every clan is organized so that each member has a well-defined role and
a specific skill to contribute to the production process and a member’s absence has
a disproportionately negative effect on the production level. Furthermore, the loss
of a clan member implies that less protection is provided, as the other functions of
the clan, such as security of property are positively correlated with the size of the
clan. The size of the clan also acts as insurance in case of prolonged conflict; i.e. a
clan’s threat of engaging in or continuing a conflict loses credibility if their numbers
are too low to sustain a prolonged chain of hostilities. These assumptions are best
satisfied by a convex production function f(n) of a clan with n members, which
internalizes the protective effect of large numbers. One could also think of f(n) as
a function that encompasses all the benefits of large numbers, economic and not.
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Every individual’s share from the common output is f(n)/n.
Utility Function
This paper assumes that in a blood feud society there are two types of clans, weak
(denoted by W) and strong (denoted by S), depending on their honor valuation. A
clan’s honor is denoted by h and the number of people in a clan is denoted by n.
Furthermore, the per capita output of a clan is denoted by y = f(n)/n , with f(.)
denoting the production function which satisfies ∂y/∂n = [f(n)/n]/∂n > 0, as per
the discussion in the previous subsection. The two types of clans have the same
production function f(.), and the utility of both types will depend on honor and per
capita output. However the two types of clans are distinguished by different utility
functions denoted by:
UW (h, y) = UW (h, f(n)/n)
for a clan of type W , and
US(h, y) = US(h, f(n)/n)
for a clan of type S. It is assumed that within a clan each clan member has the









/∂n > 0. Furthermore,
it assumed that both ∂UW (h, y)/∂h > 0 and ∂US(h, y)/∂h > 0. How the two types
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differ in their honor valuation will be clarified shortly below.
Let there be two clans I and J that interact with each other. The functions
UW (.) and US(.) are common knowledge in a society. However, each clan knows only
its own type, but the type of the other clan is unknown. It is further assumed that
at the start of a conflict the honor levels of both clan I and J (denoted respectively
as hI and hJ) are equal to ĥ, i.e. hI=hJ=ĥ. The number of clan members for clan I
and J (respectively nI and nJ) at the beginning of the conflict is also the same and
it equals n̂, i.e nI=nJ=n̂. Thus, the utility levels of clan I and J at the beginning
of a conflict are respectively denoted as:
UI = UI(ĥ, f(n̂)/n̂) =

UW (ĥ, f(n̂)/n̂) if clan I is of type W
US(ĥ, f(n̂)/n̂) if clan I is of type S
and
UJ = UJ(ĥ, f(n̂)/n̂) =

UW (ĥ, f(n̂)/n̂) if clan J is of type W
US(ĥ, f(n̂)/n̂) if clan J is of type S
The action space for each clan during the interaction is A = {k, c} where
k stands for kill, and c stands for concede. Let aI ∈ A and aJ ∈ A denote the
actions of clan I and J , respectively. Honor and output will depend on the actions
of both clans (aI , aJ), which therefore indirectly affect the utility. Thus, at any
point during a conflict, the utility of both clans can be alternatively described as
the utility associated with a particular strategy profile, S(aI , aJ).
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“Weak” and “Strong” Types Clarified
The basic trade-off during a retaliatory conflict is that between an increase in a
clan’s honor and a decrease in a clan’s number of members. The strong types are
the ones with a high-valuation of honor, for which, essentially, the increase in honor
more than compensates for the loss of life during a conflict.
If clan I decides to kill following an offense, its honor stock increases from ĥ to
ĥ + s. If clan J chooses to further retaliate, clan I’s number of members decreases
from n̂ to n̂− 1 and per capita output becomes yI = f(n̂− 1)/(n̂− 1).
A strong clan values the increase in honor more than the decrease in per capita
output, which means that at the end of a period with retaliatory conflict their utility
is higher than at the beginning of the period. So, for a strong clan I, the first-period
utility associated with retaliatory conflict equals:
UI = U
S(ĥ + s, f(n̂ − 1)/(n̂ − 1)), which is s.t. US(ĥ + s, f(n̂ − 1)/(n̂ − 1)) >
US(ĥ, f(n̂)/n̂).
A weak clan values the increase in honor less than the decrease in per capita output,
and at the end of a period with retaliatory conflict they are worse off than at the
beginning. For a low-valuation (weak) type the utility associated with retaliatory
conflict is:
UI = U
W (ĥ+ s, f(n̂− 1)/(n̂− 1)) s.t UW (ĥ+ s, f(n̂− 1)/(n̂− 1)) < UW (ĥ, f(n̂)/n̂).
Thus, essentially, a high or low valuation of honor translates respectively into a
high or low valuation of conflict. It is assumed that a clan is strong with a priori
probability p∗, reflecting the ratio of strong groups in a society, which is common
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knowledge.
4.4.1 Conflict Sequence and Timing
Two clans I and J are paired up with each-other in a potential conflictual situation.
In addition, nature allocates the right to start a conflict by flipping a fair coin. The
clan that has the right to make the first move has the choice to act or walk away. In
this context, the conflictual situation is defined as one where a dispute arises which
can be interpreted by the clan with the right to the first move as an offence. The
clan with the right to the first move has the option of reacting to what they consider
an offence by killing a member of the other clan or of not taking offence and walking
away. If they choose to strike, the other clan faces the option of whether to retaliate
by killing an opposite clan member or to not retaliate, concede and end the conflict.
If they retaliate, the opposing clan faces the same choice and so on, until one of
them backs out of the conflict and the conflict ends. The sequence of actions in the
first period is depicted in Figure 4.1.
In this game, the clan with the right to the first move is the counterpart of
the entrant and the other clan is the counterpart of the incumbent in the entrant-
incumbent game. Hence, there are two sub-periods in every period: In the first
sub-period the clan with the right to move first (which, for the sake of simplicity,
is designated to be Clan I) decides whether to initiate a conflict or not. In the
second subperiod the responding clan (Clan J) decides whether to retaliate or not.
The feud ends when any of the parties decides not to retaliate at any given point.
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The payoffs are realized at the end of every period, or alternatively at the end of a
subperiod after which the conflict relationship ends.
Figure 4.1: Game Tree
Payoffs for Clan I (Initiating Group)
As defined above, the utility of clan I when deciding not to act upon the offence and
concede, or their no-conflict utility, is:
UI = UI(ĥ, f(n̂)/n̂) =

UW (ĥ, f(n̂)/n̂) if clan I is of type W
US(ĥ, f(n̂)/n̂) if clan I is of type S
Let it be assumed that both a strong and a weak clan normalize their no-
conflict utility above, (i.e. their period 0 utility) to 0. The no-conflict utility will,
thus, become the benchmark against which both types of clans will evaluate their
utility at any point during the conflict.
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The utility of a strong clan I at the end of the first period, after clan I chooses
to kill and clan J retaliates is5 :
UI = U
S(ĥ+ s, f(n̂− 1)/(n̂− 1)) = βS1
In the second period, if clan I decides to continue the conflict and clan J retaliates,
clan I’s honor increases to ĥ+2s and per capita output decreases to f(n̂−2)/(n̂−2).
The utility of a strong clan I at the end of the second period of retaliatory conflict
is:
UI = U
S(ĥ+ 2s, f(n̂− 2)/(n̂− 2)) = βS2 .
For a strong clan,
US(ĥ+ 2s, f(n̂− 2)/(n̂− 2)) > US(ĥ+ s, f(n̂− 1)/(n̂− 1)) > US(ĥ, f(n̂)/(n̂))6.
So, for a strong clan, the utility from retaliatory conflict is always positive, and (if




3 < · · · < βSt .
The utility of a weak clan I at the end of the first period is:
UI = U
W (ĥ+ s, f(n̂− 1)/(n̂− 1)) = βW1 , and at the end of the second period it is:
UI = U
W (ĥ+ 2s, f(n̂− 2)/(n̂− 2)) = βW2 .
For a weak clan,
UW (ĥ+ 2s, f(n̂− 2)/(n̂− 2)) < UW (ĥ+ s, f(n̂− 1)/(n̂− 1)) < UW (ĥ, f(n̂)/n̂).
Similarly, for a weak clan, the utility from conflict is negative and decreasing in




3 > · · · > βWt .
Whenever clan J backs off the conflict at a given period T (which becomes
the last period of the conflict) and does not retaliate, a clan I attains an increase in
5The symbols β, α, and δ denote particular values that the utility function takes, in order to
facilitate comparison with the no-conflict utility at the beginning of the game. The superscript
denotes the clan type and the subscript denotes the time period.
6Please refer to the discussion on “weak” and “strong” types above.
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honor SST if strong or S
W
T if weak sufficient to net them a positive utility of:
UI =

UW (ĥ+ SWT , f(n̂− T − 1))/(n̂− (T − 1)) = αWT > 0 if clan I is of type W
US(ĥ+ SST , f(n̂− T − 1))/(n̂− (T − 1)) = αST > 0 if clan I is of type S
So, SST and S
W
T and increases in time to counterbalance the loss of life at the
end of a conflict; the longer the conflict goes on, the higher is the honor bonus one
obtains at the end of it if the opponent concedes. This could be treated as a prize
for persevering and not backing off the conflict. It is further assumed that the honor
bonus one receives at the end of the conflict is large enough to net the survivor a
utility level equal to the one earned when the other clan backs off in the first stage,
i.e. SST and S
W
T is such that:
UI =

UW (ĥ+ SWT , f(n̂− T − 1))/(n̂− (t− 1)) = UW (ĥ+ s, f(n̂)/n̂) if clan I is of type W
US(ĥ+ SST , f(n̂− T − 1))/(n̂− (t− 1)) = US(ĥ+ s, f(n̂)/n̂) if clan I is of type S
or αWT = α
W




1 > 0. It must be noted that, in the case of a weak
type, only the last period payoff is positive. That is to say, at any period t before
the last one the weak type nets βWt < 0.
Finally, if the initiator clan I concedes after period T of retaliatory conflict,
their honor and number of clan members is the same as in the previous period,
hence they net the same level of utility they netted in the previous period, and the
game ends.
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Payoffs for Clan J (Responding Group)
Similarly, the respondent clan J utility associated with retaliatory conflict in a period
t will be:
UJ = U
S(ĥ + ts, f(n̂ − t)/(n̂ − t)) = βSt , where 0 < βS1 < βS2 < βS3 < · · · < βSt if
Clan J is a strong clan, and
UJ = U
W (ĥ+ ts, f(n̂− t)/(n̂− t)) = βWt , where 0 > βW1 > βW2 > βW3 > · · · > βWt if
Clan J is a Weak clan.
If clan I does not initiate a conflict or concedes at the beginning of the first
period, clan J’s per capita output remains unchanged, but their honor stock increases
to ĥ + s, reflecting the fact that the other party conceded and backed out of the
conflict. If clan I concedes at the beginning of period T, clan J obtains an honor
bonus of SST if strong and S
W
T if weak. So, similar to the case of the initiator clan,
respondent clan J utility associated with concession of the opponent at a given
period T will be:
UJ = U
S(ĥ + ST , f(n̂− T − 1))/(n̂− (T − 1)) = αST s.t. αST = αS1 > 0 if clan J is a
strong clan, and
UJ = U
W (ĥ+ ST , f(n̂− T − 1))/(n̂− (T − 1)) = αWT s.t. αWT = αW1 > 0 if clan J is
a weak clan.
Differently from the case of the initiator clan, however, whenever a respondent
clan J concedes, they forfeit the right to retaliate after they have lost a clan member
in that particular period. If clan J concedes in the first period, their honor is the
same, but their number fall to n̂− 1. Their period 1 utility becomes:
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UJ = U
S(ĥ, f(n̂− 1))/(n̂− 1)) = δS1 < 0 if clan J is a strong clan7, and
UJ = U
W (ĥ, f(n̂− 1))/(n̂− 1)) = δW1 < 0 if clan J is a weak clan
If clan J waits until period T to concede, in the last period they obtain8:
UJ = U
S(ĥ+ (T − 1)s, f(n̂− T )/(n̂− T )) = δST if clan J is a strong clan, and
UJ = U
W (ĥ+ (T − 1)s, f(n̂− T )/(n̂− T )) = δWT if clan J is a weak clan.
4.4.2 Equilibrium
Constant Payoffs
To be able to formally characterize the equilibrium, this section makes two further
assumptions. First, it is assumed that the number of clan members is replenished
to n̂ at the beginning of every period, i.e. there is a population growth of 1/n̂ per
period. Second, the increase in honor s associated with retaliatory conflict is not
permanent, but period-specific. The honor of a clan increases to ĥ + s during a
period of retaliatory conflict, but falls back to ĥ at the beginning of the following
period.
These assumptions essentially set a lower boundary on a clan’s population
and an upper boundary on its honor, thus preventing a clan from precipitating into
a situation with an extremely high honor but nobody to enjoy it. Hence, while
rendering the formal demonstration of the existence of an equilibrium easier, they
do not necessarily impose unrealistic restrictions on the model.
7A strong clan would find it optimal not concede, but the hypotethical strong clan payoff is
added here for the sake of completeness.
8It must be noted that at every point t before the end of the conflict they obtain a payoff of




Under the assumptions above, during each period with retaliatory conflict an
initiating clan (I) obtains9:
UI = U
S(ĥ+ s, f(n̂− 1)/(n̂− 1)) = βS > 0 if clan I is a strong clan, and
UI = U
W (ĥ+ s, f(n̂− 1)/(n̂− 1)) = βW < 0 if clan I is a weak clan.
If the other clan concedes, an initiating clan I obtains a one-time payoff of:
UI = U
S(ĥ+ s, f(n̂)/(n̂)) = αS > 0 if clan I is a strong clan, and
UI = U
W (ĥ+ s, f(n̂)/(n̂) = αW > 0 if clan I is a weak clan.
If clan I concedes, clan I obtains a utility of 0 whether weak or strong.
Simlarly, a strong responding clan (J) obtains βS > 0 during each period of
retaliatory conflict, αS > 0 when the other clan concedes, and δS < 0 if they concede
themselves10.
A weak responding clan (J) obtains βW < 0 during each period of retaliatory conflict,
αW > 0 when the other clan concedes, and δW < 0 if they concede themselves.
Equilibrium: The Strategy
A strong clan nets a payoff of βS > 0 at any period with retaliatory conflict and
αS > 0 if the other clan concedes. It is clear that, whether they initiate or respond
to a conflict, the dominant strategy for the strong types is to never concede, as the
utility they obtain from conflict is strictly positive. As a result, conflicts between
strong types will prove to be the ones with the highest duration, and in fact continue
until the end of the game, or virtually infinitely. On the other hand, a weak clan
9Under these assumptions, all payoffs equal period 1 payoffs from subsection 4.4.1, so the time
subscript is dropped as redundant.
10Please refer to subsection 4.4.1 above.
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engages in a conflict with the hope that the opponent backs off. They have a
negative valuation of retaliatory conflict (βW < 0) per period, so the earlier in the
game the opponent backs off, the better. The longer the continuation of the conflict,
the larger are the losses for the weak type.
In this form, the game is defined in terms very similar to Kreps and Wilson
(1982) and Fudenberg and Kreps (1987). The solution and characterization of the
equilibrium is also similar. Fudenberg and Kreps (1987) adopt a continuous time
frame with time increasing in the interval from 0 to 1, which, in the context of this
paper, provides a virtually infinite amount of interactions between clans while still
making it possible to attain a closed form solution. For as long as the conflict goes
on, a clan would get tβW , where 0 < t < 1. If and when, eventually, the opponent
concedes, the surviving party realizes a one-time payoff of αW > 0.
Hence, the conflict between two weak clans will resemble a “game of chicken”.
In the equilibrium of the game, if neither clan backs off at the beginning of the
conflict, both have a “concession rate” (Fudenberg and Kreps 1987) which means
they will adopt a strategy to concede at a certain rate during the game for as long as
the conflict goes on. In addition, the initial probability that the opponent is strong
is p∗ (the known distribution), but if the opponent has not conceded yet, each
clan updates the probability they assign to the opponent being strong. The time-
dependent posterior probability of the conflict-initiating opponent (clan I) being
strong is labeled pIt and the posterior probability of the responding opponent (clan
J) being strong as pJt .
The concession rate that a weak initiating clan (I) will adopt (or the probability
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that it will concede at time t if it has not yet conceded) is defined as π(pIt , p
J
t , t).
Similarly, the concession rate of the respondent (J) in the hypothesized equilibrium
of the game is defined as θ(pIt , p
J
t , t).
Following Fudenberg and Kreps (1987), the hypothesized equilibrium is a
mixed strategy equilibrium where the weak clan mixes between conceding at the
very beginning or waiting until a time t and then conceding. For the weak initiator
clan (I) to mix, they must be indifferent between conceding at the very beginning
(in which case the payoff is 0) or at time t. If they wait until time t to concede, there
are potential losses and benefits. By that time, the respondent clan will not have
conceded with probability close to one, in which case clan I gets tβW < 0. There
is a small chance, though, that opponent J will have conceded, (1− pJt )θt, which is
the probability that clan J is weak (1− pJt ) multiplied by the probability that they
will concede until time t, θt. In that case, clan I receives a net onetime benefit of
αW > 0. To be indifferent between conceding at time 0 or at time t, clan I must
have the same expected payoff from both cases, that is:
0 = tβW + (1− pJt )θtαW . (4.1)
Similarly, for clan J (the respondent) to be indifferent between conceding at
time 0 (in which case their payoff is δW < 0) and waiting until time t, then conceding,
it must be that:
δW = tβW + δW + (1− pIt )πtαW . (4.2)
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Simplifying both sides leads to:
0 = βW + (1− pJt )θαW (4.3)
and
0 = βW + (1− pIt )παW . (4.4)
If the weak initiator I uses the concession strategy π, then pIt (the posterior
probability assigned to him being strong) will change with time. In fact, pIt will
increase with time; the more clan I stays in the game, the larger the probability








= pIt (1− pIt )π. (4.6)
Substituting equation 4.6 into 4.4 and 4.5 into 4.3 and dividing 4.4 by 4.3,






t which leads to p
J
t = a · pIt for some constant a.
In order to have a mixed-strategy equilibrium as described above it must be
the case that a = 1 (Fudenberg and Kreps, 1987). A value of a > 1 would imply that
pIt reaches the value of 1 when p
J
t < 1, which is incompatible with an equilibrium
where clan I uses a concession strategy π. Instead, they could wait until pIt = 1,
at which point clan J concedes and they net a positive value. Hence, in order to
have a probability as described above, the posterior probabilities must evolve along
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the pJt = p
I
t line in the probability space. In equilibrium, the expected payoffs for a
weak clan I (the initiator) and clan J are respectively 0 and δW .
4.4.3 Discussion
As presented above, the model used in this paper provides a platform to reconcile
different definitions of blood feuds as well as different views regarding their replica-
tion dynamics.
First, it addresses questions that might arise with regard to the two definitions
of feud described above, namely that of Middleton and Tait of feud as a conflict
relationship that entails the obligation (or at least, desire) of both involved parties
to terminate it when presented with the possibility; and the definition of feud as an
“eternal conflict” that both Peters and Black-Michaud incline to accept.
The Middleton and Tait definition fails to address the fact that a number of
feuds last for a very long time despite the unambiguous existence of possibilities of
termination. In this model, that could be explained by the high marginal utility
of honor of the strong types. That means that in any period in time there are a
number of conflicts that last for an indefinitely long period.
The “eternal conflict” definition does not seem to offer a good explanation
for the existence of many short-lived feuds. In addition, of all real world examples
provided (Durham, 1909; Ginat, 1987) none entails one clan’s engagement in more
than one feud at a time. If one were to accept the “eternal conflict” definition,
one could easily end up with a network of feuds pinning every clan in conflicting
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relations with many others.
In sum, this model predicts that only a fraction of feuds would be infinitely
long-lived, the rest would last only for a short period of time, reflecting the low
marginal utility of honor (and conflict) for the weak types. This result is supported
by a case brought by Durham (1909, p.61), where the household head clearly states
that the number of deaths he thought were necessary to bring the conflict to an end
was five. This clearly shows an implicit forward-looking calculation of the trade-off
between increasing his clan’s honor and loss of lives, and also shows that, in this
particular case, this clan’s valuation of conflict was not high enough to continue
feuding for an infinitely long period.
To the credit of the “eternal conflict” hypothesis, however, there is evidence
of “renewed conflict” provided to us by Durham (1909, p.199): “. . . The paying of
blood-gelt does not stop a feud. In a recent case the feud had ceased for years. But
when the son of a man who had ended it grew to be fifteen years old, and was now
head of the family, he declared that as the family honor had been sold when he was
an infant, he was not bound by the oath, so went forth with his gun and shot a man
of the other house. And the feud began again.” The model used in this paper does
not capture the dynamics of the change in the valuation of honor over generations.
However, once such a change occurs and a feud is restarted, then the course of
that feud is bound to be the same as predicted by the model. Assuming long-
term concavity of the utility function in honor and introducing a relativistic honor
concept would be a good first step. That would mean that the lower a clan’s honor
falls below that of the population average (as a result of recent conflict inactivity),
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the more attractive engaging in a feud becomes. One way to do that would be to
revive an old conflict. Not accounting for changes in honor over time is a significant
limitation of the model.
The model also does not account for different clan sizes, while it is, in fact,
likely for clan size to be correlated with clan type. That is particularly easy to see
if one refers to the time-varying payoff structure in Section 4.4.1. As a conflict goes
on, a larger clan would have a higher conflict tolerance, as they would have more
members to spare. That would mean that a larger clan would have a higher ex-ante
conflict inclination. The introduction of both features is beyond the scope of this
paper and is left for further research.
Second, this model bridges the roles of honor and collective responsibility in
causing and perpetuating feuds. This paper argues that both concepts are insepa-
rable for a proper analysis. Without the concept of honor blood feuds would not
be initiated at all, as a clan’s high valuation of honor (which is a result of the to-
tal scarcity conditions described by Black-Michaud) is the only aspect that could
possibly counterbalance the loss of life. On the other side, in a society with a high
valuation of honor, but without collective responsibility and its abovementioned
characteristics one also would not witness blood feuds. If anything, one would see
occasional duels (and duel killings) to avenge honor infringements, but these would
not precipitate inter-clan feuds as everyone’s honor would be only his own and there
would be no point in engaging in violence upon another clan member’s death. This
is illustrated by the fact that, in societies with a high valuation of honor, feuds such
as Hattfield-McCoy are special cases that arise only under conditions of collective
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responsibility. And when collective responsibility is not a prevailing feature feuds
are few and far between rather than a commanding historical reality.
4.5 Collective Responsibility and Blood Feuds as
Endogenous Institutions: A Tale of Two Re-
gions
The previous sections illustrate how “collective responsibility” has a primary role in
perpetuating blood feuds. In its absence an offence could certainly lead to violence,
but not to blood feuds, as seeking revenge would be up to the individual rather than
a duty of the clan. In addition, the pre-specified collective production function is the
backbone of collective responsibility; once output becomes a function of individual
effort rather than clan belongingness, individuals drift away from the clan and are
unwilling to share responsibility for other clan members’ actions. Ginat (1987)
mentions a case where a member of a diyya group that has a job as a teacher
in the Israeli public sector asks to be declared an outsider and excused from all
responsibilities and rights that apply to him as a member of the diyya group. Under
normal conditions this would be the worst possible sanction that the clan could take
against a deviant member, but in this case the prospect of a steady income stream
away from the clan makes membership and the collective responsibility that comes
with it too costly. Hence, it can be argued that developments that would induce
the individuals to shift from a collectivistic mode of production to an individualistic
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one would contribute in the demise of collective responsibility and the blood feud
as an institution.
The best illustration of this argument is provided by the divergence in institu-
tional evolution paths, including the survival of blood feuds, between mountainous
South-Western Albania (the area called Himara and Laberia) and Northern Albania
after a relative change in the respective degrees of openness to outside markets. Both
regions proved uncontrollable and ungovernable for the Ottoman Empire and were
granted substantial autonomy. Both had adopted very similar norms (Kanuns), to
the point that scholars hint at the existence of a common Albanian customary law.
They both were societies with similar economic and political conditions and both
displayed a high occurrence of blood feuds (Elezi, 2006). Yet, even though blood
feuds in South-Western Albania continued to survive well into the 20th century,
they did so at a lower rate and were gradually phased out (ibid.) to the point that
the government had no difficulty in permanently eradicating them after 1944. The
difference in South-Western Albania was that the region bordered the Adriatic Sea
on its Western side. This gave them access to the European labor market (Zamputi
et al., 1962) of the time for mercenaries, and they proved to be a valuable addition to
the forces of various European princes (ibid.). From the same source one can deduce
that this was a significant source of employment during the period from the 16th
to the 18th century. Pappas (mimeo) states that “the hiring and maintenance of
stradioti troops was continued in Naples until the early 18th century. Most of these
troops were later recruited from Epirus and Southern Albania. . . ” and Brunnbauer
(2004) extends that time period until the early 19th century.
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Access to an outside labor market provided mountainous South-Western Al-
bania with an alternative source of income which did not require the collectivistic
mode of production (mercenaries were basically government employees). That trig-
gered a transition from a collectivistic mode of production to an individualistic one
and this development undermined the very core of the institutional network that
supported blood feuds. This is supported by Elezi (2006) where, in an analysis of
the diverging paths in the institutional evolution in the two regions, he states that
the large patriarchal family in the Laberi region (South-Western Albania) started
to disintegrate by the 18th century and was replaced by smaller-size units, typically
containing 10-20 individuals as opposed to the much larger units in Northern Alba-
nia, which could reach up to 100 individuals. Elezi also states that the emergence
of capitalistic relations in South-Western Albania occurred at a much earlier time
than in Northern Albania and, from his analysis, one can deduce that it predates
the disintegration of the large patriarchal family. In addition, he views the relation-
ships with Italy and Greece as an important catalyst of the institutional changes in
South-Western Albania.
A formal treatment of the conditions under which a society can escape a blood-
feud equilibrium driven by collective responsibility and settle on a institutional path
where individuals engage in market activity and are able to shoulder the protection
cost is beyond the scope of this paper. It is, however, a direction into which further
research could naturally expand. The new payoff structure, in order to be long-
lasting, would need to provide incentives to the society to renegotiate and redesign
new institutional arrangements.
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There are a few studies at which one can look to test the result of the hypothesis
that the presence and viability of a market economy leads to a weakening of the
system of collective responsibility and, as a result, to lower violence levels. One of
the most relevant is Villareal (2003), an empirical study that examines modern rural
violence in Mexico, specifically in agrarian regions with collective responsibility. The
findings of the study are in line with the argument from previous sections that in
the absence of proper government control, collective responsibility can contribute to
a reduction in violence.
Surprisingly, when it comes to the effects of marketization, the study tests
the hypothesis and reaches the exact opposite conclusion, i.e. that marketization
contributes to an increase in violence. However, closer inspection shows that this
result does not necessarily contradict the argument above. Marketization, or “the
introduction of capitalist forms of agricultural production” in their study comes
in the form of the introduction of cash crops such as coffee, and not in the form
of an alternative individualistic mode of production that can potentially outper-
form the collective responsibility system. In fact, parallel to the conclusions of the
model presented earlier, the introduction of cash crops (whose production can ex-
hibit economies of scale) would only increase the payoffs associated with being a
clan member, hence increasing clan dependence and contributing to an increase in
violence. This could be classified as “collectivistic” rather than “individualistic”
marketization. Illegal activities would typically fit in the former category and, as




This paper seeks to narrate how and why a community can adopt a certain set of
rules and explain how this set of rules and arrangements tends to perpetuate itself.
It is important to realize that, while delivering in the short run in terms of providing
a set of rules for the community, regulating violence and preventing the society from
falling into a spiral of anarchy, these institutions might well outlive their use, locking
a region into an individually and socially inefficient equilibrium.
This paper is based on anthropological evidence from communities in which,
excepting economic welfare, honor, as the only marker of social differentiation, is
greatly important to utility. It is this relative importance that stems from conditions
of total scarcity that, together with the institution of collective responsibility and the
absence of a third party to help resolve disputes causes the community to settle into
a socially inefficient development path. In these communities, extracting revenge
by killing people and engaging in a blood feud is not, as one might be tempted to
think, just a way to extract justice in absence of a judiciary system. It is, in fact,
a way to send the signal that one’s clan (group) is ready to protect their right to
exist without actually having to engage in a conflict over the means and sources of
survival. The desire to send this signal and the inability of clans to read into other
clans’ readiness to fight causes them to exchange more “signals” (killings) than they
would have had they been fully informed about that readiness.
In such cases the access of all agents in a society to alternative economic activi-
ties, in which output is a function of individual effort rather than clan belongingness,
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5.1 Aspirations and Life Satisfaction in Transi-
tion: How Wanting More Increases Happi-
ness
A number of studies, notably Easterlin (1974, 2003b) have found that in developed
countries life satisfaction in the long run is essentially unresponsive to increases
in income. The explanation provided stressed the constantly adapting nature of
aspirations to changes in income as the main reason for the lack of increase in life
satisfaction. Social comparison and adaptation have a positive effect on aspirations,
whose increase has a negative effect on life satisfaction, thereby canceling out any
initial increase in satisfaction due to the increase in income (Easterlin, 2003b). These
results, however, have been challenged by a number of recent studies that show that
life satisfaction is positively correlated to income accross individuals, countries and
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time periods. This paper adds to the latter group and shows that in transition Russia
income does have a positive effect on satisfaction, especially when the income level is
still relatively low. The data from the Russian Panel show that life satisfaction hits
a flat portion during the late phase of transition, suggesting that the effect of social
comparison and adaptation might materialize after individuals have been exposed
to income fluctuations for a sufficiently long period.
Evaluating the aspiration formation process is one of the purposes of this
paper and a closer analysis of panel data from the beginning of this decade in
Russia shows that the effect of adaptation on income aspirations is weak and the
main factor behind the increases in aspirations is social comparison. The effects of
proximity-based reference group income and market-based reference group income
are of comparable magnitude, suggesting that the income of individuals one is in
constant interaction with is as important to one’s aspirations formation process as
is the income of individuals with similar job market characteristics. In addition, the
effects of the two reference group income measures vary across age groups. Both
reference group income measures have a significant effect on the aspirations of young
and middle-aged individuals, but among older individuals aspirations are affected
only by proximity-based reference group income.
In a departure from results of previous studies (Stutzer, 2004), this paper finds
that aspirations have a positive effect on life satisfaction. This can be explained by
the income expectations embedded in aspirations; increases in aspirations may re-
flect not only higher needs and consumption standards, but also a higher expected
income. Hirschman and Rothschild (1973) argue that in a developing country a
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higher income of relevant others can act a positive signal about one’s own expected
income and have a positive effect on life satisfaction. The aspiration-centered anal-
ysis in this paper supports that argument. Individuals use the income of relevant
others to form their aspirations, which come to contain income expectations. The
higher income expectations embedded in aspirations cause the latter to have a pos-
itive effect on life satisfaction.
5.2 Wealth and Happiness of Nations: The Re-
source Curse from a New Angle
This paper attempts to bridge the natural resources literature and the life satisfac-
tion literature. It does so by evaluating the effect of different types of accumulated
wealth on average life satisfaction across countries. The results show that while
both produced and natural capital have a positive effect on life satisfaction, the
effect of the latter is stronger and remains significant even after accounting for the
quality of formal institutions and the existence of informal safety nets. Democratic
institutions and informal safety nets retain their positive effect on life satisfaction.
However, when natural wealth is further disaggregated into diffuse resources and
subsoil resources, the latter have no significant effect on life satisfaction. Most of
the positive effect that natural capital has is due to diffuse resources like cropland,
pastureland or forestry. Hence, echoing results from the vast literature on natural
resources, this paper finds that the same type of resource endowment that is likely
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to contribute to higher growth rates and more democratic institutions is also likely
to contribute to a higher life satisfaction. Beyond the direct wealth effect, this could
be due to the diffuse resources’ contribution to a more broad-based and equitable
development, as well as their generating a higher level of positive externalities.
5.3 Blood Feuds: The Economics of a Dismal In-
stitution
This paper seeks to narrate how and why a community can adopt a certain set of
rules and explain how this set of rules and arrangements tends to perpetuate itself.
It is important to realize that, while delivering in the short run in terms of providing
a set of rules for the community, regulating violence and preventing the society from
falling into a spiral of anarchy, these institutions might well outlive their use, locking
a region into an individually and socially inefficient equilibrium.
This paper is based on anthropological evidence from communities in which,
excepting economic welfare, honor, as the only marker of social differentiation, is
greatly important to utility. It is this relative importance that stems from conditions
of total scarcity that, together with the institution of collective responsibility and the
absence of a third party to help resolve disputes causes the community to settle into
a socially inefficient development path. In these communities, extracting revenge
by killing people and engaging in a blood feud is not, as one might be tempted to
think, just a way to extract justice in absence of a judiciary system. It is, in fact,
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a way to send the signal that one’s clan (group) is ready to protect their right to
exist without actually having to engage in a conflict over the means and sources of
survival. The desire to send this signal and the inability of clans to read into other
clans’ readiness to fight causes them to exchange more “signals” (killings) than they
would have had they been fully informed about that readiness.
In such cases the access of all agents in a society to alternative economic activi-
ties, in which output is a function of individual effort rather than clan belongingness,




Aspirations and Life Satisfaction
in Transition: How Wanting More
Increases Happiness
A.1 Econometric Model and Estimation
Both dependent variables, life satisfaction and satisfaction with economic condi-
tions, are ordered response variables ranging from one to five (as described below).
The data is in panel format where individuals are followed over at least two con-
secutive periods. To describe the estimation method this appendix begins with a
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simple ordered probit model for a single cross section, and subsequently expand
the model for panel data. Throughout the appendix it is assumed that the data
are cross-sectionally independent and identically distributed. Assumptions on in-
dependence over time will follow. This appendix focuses on life satisfaction as the
response variable, but the same assumptions hold as regards satisfaction with eco-
nomic conditions.




iβ + ui, ui|Xi ∼ N(0, 1)
where LS∗i is latent life satisfaction, Xi is a column vector of observable individual
characteristics, such as income, aspirations, age, education and employment status,
and ui denotes the unobserved disturbance terms, which are assumed to be be
distributed independently of Xi. Latent life satisfaction LS
∗
i is captured by LSi,
an ordered variable that takes integer values from 1 to 5, and LSi is related to
LS∗i through the threshold model below,
1 where a higher value indicates a higher
satisfaction level.
1In this specification, the thresholds (λj) pertaining to the relationship between the latent
dependent variable and the observed satisfaction index are not individual-specific and are treated




1 if LS∗i ∈ (−∞, λ1]
2 if LS∗i ∈ (λ1, λ2]
3 if LS∗i ∈ (λ2, λ3]
4 if LS∗i ∈ (λ3, λ4]
5 if LS∗i ∈ (λ4,∞)
Given the normal distribution of ui, the conditional response probabilities can
be computed as:
P (LSi = 1|Xi) = P (LS∗i ≤ λ1|Xi) = P (Xiβ + ui ≤ λ1|Xi)
= Φ(λ1 −Xiβ)
P (LSi = 2|Xi) = P (λ1 < LS∗i ≤ λ2|Xi)
= Φ(λ2 −Xiβ)− Φ(λ1 −Xiβ)
...
P (LSi = 5|Xi) = P (LS∗i > λ4|Xi)
= 1− Φ(λ4 −Xiβ),
where Φ(·) denotes the c.d.f. of the standard normal distribution.
As it stands, β and λ1, . . . , λ4 and can be estimated by maximum likelihood.
The log-likehood function for each individual i is:
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logLi(λ, β) = 1[LSi = 1] log[Φ(λ1 −X ′iβ)]+
+1[LSi = 2] log[Φ(λ2 −X ′iβ)− Φ(λ1 −X ′iβ)] + . . .
. . .+ 1[LSi = 5] log[1− Φ(λ4 −X ′iβ)]
This function can be routinely estimated (Wooldridge, 2002, p.505).
The model is next expanded to a panel of N cross-sections and T time periods.
It is assumed that the observations are i.i.d. in the cross-sectional dimension. To
account for possible unobserved heterogeneity time-invariant individual effects are
included into the model. With the individual effects ci the latent variable model is:
LS∗it = X
′
itβ + ci + uit, uit|Xi, ci ∼ N(0, 1) (A.1)
where Xi = (Xi1 . . . XiT ). It is assumed that
Xit is strictly exogeneous conditional on ci
and that
ui1, . . . , uiT are independent conditional on (Xi, ci).
Treating the ci as parameters to be estimated alongside β in the spirit of fixed
effects analysis would lead to the incidental parameters problem (Wooldridge, 2002,
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p. 484). With T fixed andN →∞ estimating the ci alongside β leads to inconsistent
estimates of both. On the other hand, the traditional random effects assumption of
ci|Xi ∼ N(0, σc) can be too strong. It seems prudent to allow the ci to be correlated
with Xi as it is plausible for the unobserved effects to be correlated with covariates
such as income and education. Following Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1980),




where X̄i is the average of Xit over time and αi|Xi ∼ N(0, σα). The latent response





iγ + αi + uit (A.2)
which is an ordered probit version of Chamberlain’s random effects probit model. It
is assumed that αi and ui = (ui1...uiT ) are independent conditional on Xi, αi|Xi ∼
N(0, σα) and ui|Xi ∼ N(0, IT ).
The joint distribution of (LSi1, . . . , LSiTi)
2 conditional on Xi (integrating over
the unobservable αi) is (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 485; Boes and Winkelmann, 2006):
2Due to panel attrition, some individuals are present for all three years of 2000-2002 period
and some for only two of them. Hence the notation Ti for the total time periods an individual was
present in the panel, where Ti ∈ {2, 3}.
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The log-likelihood function for each individual i is:




1[LSit = 1] log[Φ(λ1 −X ′itβ − X̄ ′iγ − αi)]+
+1[LSit = 2] log[Φ(λ2 −X ′itβ − X̄ ′iγ − αi)− Φ(λ1 −X ′itβ − X̄ ′iγ − αi)]
. . .+ 1[LSit = 5] log[1− Φ(λ4 −X ′itβ − X̄ ′iγ − αi)]
)
Equation A.3 is amenable to Gauss-Hermite quadrature for numerical approx-
imation (Boes and Winkelmann, 2006). After that the parameters can be estimated
using reoprob (Frechette, 2001), an existing STATA command that yields maxi-
mum likelihood estimators for random effects ordered probit models. The reoprob
estimators share the general properties of maximum likelihood estimators, i.e. they
are consistent, asymptotically efficient and asymptotically normal. Reoprob uses
the analytic first derivatives method and approximates the likelihood function for
each unit using Gauss-Hermite quadrature (Frechette, 2001).
A Likelihood Ratio test is performed to compare models A.2 and A.1. The
latter model is rejected in favor of the former; that is, the model performs better
after the inclusion of individual averages of Xit over time. Hence, the model A.2 is
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used to estimate the effects of income, aspirations and other variables in Section 5.
Appendix B
Wealth and Happiness of Nations:
The Resource Curse from a New
Angle
B.1 Figures and Tables
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Figure B.1: Satisfaction with Standard of Living






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table B.2: Summary Statistics (Cont’d)
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Unit
Count on to help 148 78.9604 13.3017 29 98 Percentage
Confidence in government 141 49.06138 19.78659 16 94 Percentage
Freedom in your life 148 65.78231 16.53331 24 96 Percentage
Confidence in judicial system 144 47.67423 17.8051 15 86 Percentage
Corruption in government 141 66.13804 20.23936 4 96 Percentage
Satisfied with quality of healthcare 148 56.61423 18.94254 17 93 Percentage
Satisfied with quality of roads 149 51.39995 18.65653 7 95 Percentage
Population 0-14 years 189 33.95761 10.27614 13.43 51.35 Percentage
Population 15-64 years 189 59.63177 6.822705 46.18 79.31 Percentage
Population 65 years and above 189 6.410869 4.299729 1 20.76 Percentage
Life expectancy at birth 188 64.99299 10.64074 23.64 82.51 Years
Child mortality rate 180 76.3227 70.71342 2.5 317.7 Per Thousand
Government stability 134 7.508975 2.306503 1 12 0 to 12
Socioeconomic conditions 134 5.738274 2.143631 0 11 0 to 11
External conflict 134 6.906433 2.400268 0 12 0 to 12
Internal conflict 134 8.720152 2.716753 0 12 0 to 12
External conflict 134 9.682009 2.264037 0 12 0 to 12
Corruption 134 3.158985 1.388091 0 6.17 0 to 6.17
Military in politics 134 3.762486 1.832548 0 6.17 0 to 6.17
Religion in politics 134 4.566379 1.380159 0 6 0 to 6
Law and order 134 3.671985 1.527683 0 6 0 to 6
Ethnic tensions 134 3.950912 1.477313 0 6 0 to 6
Democratic accountability 134 3.671681 1.626549 0 6 0 to 6
Bureaucracy quality 134 2.169522 1.20419 0 4 0 to 4
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